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ABSTRACT
From the late 1970s to the early 2000s the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
underwent a dramatic transformation in how it conducted foreign policy. Over 
these three decades China went from an almost isolationist country whose 
leader proclaimed that “China would never be a superpower” to a nation which 
sought to expand its influence around the world, commonly referred to itself as 
a “great power,” and openly discussed surpassing the U.S. in both economic 
and military strength within the next 50 years. This dramatic change in how 
Chinese officials conducted foreign policy was caused not so much because of 
a shift in Chinese officials’ goals, but rather because of a transition in 
generations of Chinese leadership, a  changing international environment, an 
increased need for foreign sources of energy, and a new understanding of how 
China could use foreign policy to advance China’s longstanding development 
interests.
Although the ultimate goals for the second, third, and fourth generations of 
Chinese leadership remained similar, each generation of Chinese leadership 
approached foreign policy somewhat differently. Mao Zedong sought to 
support revolutionary causes around the world. Deng Xiaoping argued that 
China should “lay low” and devote all its energy to its own internal economic 
development. Jiang Zemin focused primarily on repairing relations with the 
U.S. following the fallout from the brutal crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 
1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Hu Jintao oversaw the 
beginning of a new truly global foreign policy strategy for China in which 
Chinese officials expanded China’s diplomatic horizons, sought to ensure 
access to foreign sources of energy, preached new concepts of international 
relations, and worked to reassure other nations that they had nothing to fear 
from China’s rise.
A shift in generations of Chinese leadership in the 1990s and 2000s had a 
profound effect on Chinese foreign policy as did the isolation China 
experienced following the government’s harsh crackdown at Tiananmen 
Square. China’s increasing need for foreign sources of energy, raw materials, 
and overseas markets further pushed Chinese officials to engage more 
countries. At the sam e time rising Chinese nationalism put pressure on 
Chinese officials to more forcefully pursue China’s interests.
Despite all these factors, and the drastic change in the conduct of Chinese 
foreign policy, at its core, the main goal for Chinese officials from the late 
1970s to the early 2000s remained ensuring China’s continued development. 
The shift to a more active foreign policy in the 2000s thus was not the result of 
a shift in the overall goals of most Chinese officials; rather, it was a result of 
Chinese officials’ realization that a more active foreign policy was now 
necessary to ensure China’s continued economic growth.
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1. Introduction
As readers are well aware, over the past several years it is has been almost
impossible to avoid discussions of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) burgeoning
superpower status and increased influence around the world. During the past year alone
there were well over a thousand news articles which mentioned “China’s rise.”1 These
discussions have not just been limited to Western observers as well. Starting primarily in
the 2000s, Communist Party of China (CPC) officials themselves increasingly openly
touted China’s growing influence and became more comfortable with the idea of China as
a major world power. As just one example of Chinese officials’ growing confidence on
the world stage in the 2000s, Lau Nai-keung, a member of the Basic Law Committee of
the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, wrote in 2008, “the Chinese
people have indeed stood up, and....China is a force to reckon with. It has joined the
[international] club” and “as a full member of the club, we have a stake in maintaining
stability and order, but we will also have our say in designing and amending the rules.”
Such statements stand in stark contrast to the China of just 30 or 40 years ago when
Chinese officials argued that China would always belong to the Third World and could
not afford to become involved in international affairs. For example, in 1974, Chinese
leader Deng Xiaoping railed against the idea that China would ever become a
superpower, saying:
China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one. If one day China 
should change its color and turn into a superpower, if it too should play the 
tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to its bullying, aggression
1 Search by author in Lexis Nexis Academic of newspapers from March 16, 2013 to March 17, 2014.
2 Lau Nai-keung, “The Chinese People Have Truly Stood Up,” South China Morning Post, August 14, 
2008.
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and exploitation, the people of the world should . . .  expose it, oppose it and 
work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.
As recently as 30 years ago, China was a relatively isolated country, with a largely
passive foreign policy. In 1988, British historian Paul Kennedy wrote that China was
“simultaneously the poorest of the major powers and probably the least well placed
strategically.”4 By the 2000s, however, China had transformed itself from an
impoverished, isolated nation to the world’s second largest economy and a major world
power, perhaps second only to the United States (U.S.) in its global influence.5 Despite
Deng’s 1974 statement, that China would never become a superpower, by the 2000s,
Chinese officials openly referred to the country as a “great power” and discussed how
they planned to surpass the U.S. in both economic and military strength by the middle of
the 21st century. Accompanying this dramatic change in China’s economic power and
international standing, was a significant change in the way Chinese officials viewed
foreign policy. While these documents lag behind the shifts that happened within
Chinese society and among most Chinese officials by several years, the dramatic changes
in the focus and complexity of China’s foreign policy can nevertheless be clearly seen in
the content of the white papers the PRC put out every two years on “China’s National
Defense.” In these policy papers there is a clear shift from the late 1990s and early 2000s
when the papers are primarily focused on protecting China’s sovereignty, to the mid to
3 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech By Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng 
Xiaoping, At the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly,” April 10, 1974, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1974/04/10.htm.
4 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (New York, NY: Random House, 1987), 554.
5 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. “Report for Selected Countries 
and Subjects,” World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, October 2012, 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/data.htm. United Nations,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?fID=2. CIA World Factbook, 
https ://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195 .html.
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late 2000s when Chinese officials became less worried about external challenges to their 
rule, and more focused on expanding China’s influence around the world. The 1998 and 
2000 versions of the White Papers on China’s National Defense read very similarly to 
PRC policy statements from the 1980s and earlier. They are highly focused on protecting 
China’s sovereignty, with the word “sovereign” or a variation appearing frequently.6 This 
was a typical concern among CPC officials, who were often fearful that outside powers 
were seeking to undermine the CPC’s rule, a fear which dated back to the events 
surrounding the PRC’s founding in 1949. By 2002, however, the word “sovereign”
n
appeared far less frequently in that year’s and later years’ official Defense White Papers. 
By 2005, rather than focusing on threats to its own sovereignty, Chinese officials were 
more focused on ensuring that other nations did not view China’s growing power as a 
threat. In 2005, the PRC put out a white paper on “China’s Peaceful Development Road” 
which only included the word “sovereign” once.8 These white papers reflected a newly 
confident China who rather than playing defense guarding against possible foreign
6 Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's 
National Defense in 1998," Beijing, China, July 1998. http://www.china.org.en/e-white/5/index.htm; 
Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's 
National Defense in 2000," Beijing, China, October 2000. http://www.china.org.cn/e- 
white/2000/index.htm See also http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17524.htm;
7 Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's 
National Defense in 2002," Beijing, China, December 2002, http://www.china.org.cn/e- 
white/20021209/index.htm See also http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_17780.htm; 
Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's 
National Defense in 2004," Beijing, China, December 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/e- 
white/20041227/index.htm See also http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_18078.htm; 
Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's 
National Defense in 2006," Beijing, China, December 2006,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm; Information Office of the State Council Of 
the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's National Defense in 2008," Beijing, China, 
January 20,2009, http://www.china.org.cn/govemment/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm See also 
http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_l210227.htm
8 Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on "China's 
Peaceful Development Road," Beijing, China, December 12,2005, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/152684.htm See also 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm
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challenges to its rule, was more focused on expanding its influence around the globe.
This paper will examine how Chinese foreign policy has changed from 1949 to 
the early 2000s as well as some of the reasons for those changes. This paper will 
primarily focus on the changes in Chinese foreign policy since the reform era which 
began in the late 1970s. It will argue that under Mao Zedong, founder of the CPC and 
leader of the PRC from 1949 to 1976, Chinese foreign policy was primarily driven by 
ideology; during Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping’s reign, Chinese foreign policy was 
driven by a fear of being pulled into international conflict which would distract from 
internal development; that under Jiang Zemin, the head of the third generation of 
leadership of the PRC, that Chinese foreign policy was primarily driven by Chinese 
officials’ desire to avoid the isolation China experienced following the PRC’s harsh 
crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and the related desire to gain the 
U.S.’ acceptance for the PRC’s continued mle in a new uni-polar international system; 
and finally that under Hu Jintao, the head of the fourth generation of leadership of the 
PRC, Chinese foreign policy was driven by the need to ensure access to overseas natural 
resources which had become vital to China’s growing economy, and by a new sense 
among Chinese officials and average citizens that China needed to do more on the world 
stage to ensure other nations did not attempt to limit China’s development.
In order to understand the historical context for China’s foreign policy from the 
1970s to the 2000s, this paper will look briefly at the beginnings of the PRC’s foreign 
policy under Mao Zedong, and how events during Mao’s rule affected later generations. 
This paper will primarily focus, however, on how China went from a largely passive 
foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and 1980s, to the more active and
4
increasingly engaged foreign policy of China under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s, and then 
finally to a burgeoning superpower with a new global strategy under Hu Jintao in the 
early 2000s. This paper will also take a closer look at how a confluence of factors during 
the late 1980s through the early 2000s, including generational shifts, increasing Chinese 
nationalism, a changing international environment, and an increased need to acquire 
energy and natural resources from overseas, helped encourage Chinese officials to 
formulate a more active and sophisticated foreign policy by the early part of the 21st 
century.
The differences in the ideology and leadership of Mao and Deng obviously had a 
huge impact on the shifts in Chinese foreign policy from the 1950s and 60s to the 1970s 
and 80s. However, during the third and fourth generations of Chinese leadership, headed 
by Jiang and Hu respectively, a single leader’s personal views on foreign policy likely 
mattered less. While Jiang and Hu each had their own theories on how China should 
conduct its foreign policy, neither Jiang nor Hu had the same cult of personality as Mao 
and Deng. Chinese leadership transformed from being centered around a single 
strongman in the first and second generations, to a more collective leadership model in 
the third and fourth generations. The shifts that occurred during Jiang’s and Hu’s time in 
office were more likely due to a combination of factors rather than simply their own 
ideologies and leadership styles.
As will be detailed further below, there were important generational shifts in the 
1990s and 2000s which affected both the Chinese populace and Chinese leadership. In 
the 1990s a new generation of CPC officials began to take over positions of power within 
the PRC. While the first and second generations of Chinese leadership were largely
5
composed of military leaders who had personally taken part in the Communist 
Revolution in China, the third and fourth generations were composed largely of 
individuals trained as engineers who then became bureaucrats or politicians, often 
referred to as “technocrats.” These new generations were generally far more educated 
than their predecessors and had more exposure to the outside world. They had also 
witnessed the failure of Mao’s radical policies and therefore were less ideological and 
approached policies, including foreign policy, from a more pragmatic perspective. These 
new generations of Chinese officials also began to see how China could use foreign 
policy to advance its development.
Shifts in Chinese society also helped push Chinese officials to adopt a more 
aggressive foreign policy. Just as a new generation of Chinese leadership was taking 
over in the 1990s and 2000s, nationalist sentiment within China was rising, particularly 
among younger segments of Chinese society. Faith in communism as an ideology had 
been waning in China for some time. The CPC, therefore, began to encourage a more 
forceful Chinese nationalism as an alternate, unifying ideology. While, the youth of the 
1980s had personally witnessed the trauma and failure of Mao’s policies and thus were 
more liberal and distrustful of the Chinese government, the youth of the 1990s and 2000s 
had grown up in a China dominated by rapid economic growth, and a sense (fostered by 
the Chinese government) that China was on the rise. In contrast to their more liberal 
predecessors, Chinese youth from the 1990s and 2000s often argued for a stronger central 
government and more aggressive Chinese foreign policies.
As China’s economy continued to grow in the 1990s and 2000s, it also became 
increasingly dependent on importing overseas sources of energy and other natural
6
resources. Whereas, during the 1980s and early 1990s, China was actually a net exporter 
of oil, natural gas, and coal, by the mid 1990s China had become a net importer of oil and 
by the mid to late 2000s China had become a net importer of natural gas and coal.9 Thus, 
securing access to these resources became a top priority for CPC officials during the 
1990s and 2000s.
The changing international environment also played a significant role in 
convincing Chinese officials to change how China approached foreign policy. During the 
post-World War II period, as decolonization took place, revolutionary and liberation 
movements spread across the Third World (also referred to as the developing world). 
Having just completed their own revolution, it was somewhat logical that Mao and the 
CPC would support like-minded groups in other countries fighting against imperialism or 
capitalism. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union dominated international relations and there was the persistent fear that the Cold 
War could turn “hot” at any minute, leading to massive armed conflict. Given this 
context and Deng’s belief that China would need several decades to recover and focus on 
its internal development, Deng’s passive, almost isolationist foreign policy makes sense. 
With such daunting economic challenges to address, China simply could not afford to be 
entangled in foreign affairs.
The late 1980s and early 1990s, however, brought about several drastic changes in 
the international arena, including the fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the U.S.
9 “2012 Report on the People’s Republic of China; Oil and Gas Security: Emergency Response of IEA
Countries,” International Energy Agency, 2012, 2-3, 6,
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/China_2012.pdf. “2012 Key World
Energy Statistics 2013 Handbook,” International Energy Agency, 2013,15.
http ://www. iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2013_FINAL_WEB .pdf. C.
Fred Bergsten et al. China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: Peter G Peterson 
Institute for International Economics and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 137 
and 160.
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as the world’s sole superpower, and large-scale protests in Tiananmen Square. Following 
the harsh crackdown by the Chinese government on the protesters in Tiananmen, Western 
powers shunned China, imposing sanctions or cutting off relations entirely. In the context 
of this isolation and the recent fall of the Soviet Union, it therefore is not surprising that 
Chinese officials in the early 1990s initially turned their focus to rebuilding ties with the 
U.S. and the West in order to gain acceptance for CPC rule. During this time, and 
partially in reaction to the West’s isolation of China following Tiananmen, Chinese 
officials also began to formulate a new foreign policy strategy which would allow China 
to maintain access to vital natural resources and overseas markets even if the U.S. or 
West attempted to isolate China again.
Despite all the changes highlighted above, since Deng’s reforms, Chinese foreign 
policy’s main goal has broadly always been to ensure China’s continued development. 
Under the circumstances of the 1970s and 1980s, Deng felt that a passive foreign policy 
would serve China’s development needs best. In the early 1990s, with the U.S. as the 
world’s only superpower, Jiang assessed that improving relations with the U.S. was 
essential for China to continue to develop. During the late 1990s and 2000s, under Jiang 
and later Hu, Chinese officials realized that in order for China to continue to grow 
economically, they would need to ensure China had access to more and more overseas 
natural resources. During this same time period, Chinese elites also began to realize that 
in order for China to continue to develop Chinese officials would need to convince the 
rest of the world that they had nothing to fear from China’s growing power. Chinese 
officials and scholars therefore began to develop a series of new strategies with the dual 
goals of improving relations with countries with large supplies of natural resources and
8
winning the rest of the world’s acceptance for China’s rise. Thus while Chinese officials’ 
practice and understanding of foreign policy changed drastically from the 1970s to the 
2000s, the underlying goal of Chinese foreign policy always remained ensuring China’s 
continued economic development. The story of the drastic shift in Chinese foreign policy 
during the past 40 years therefore is not one of changing motives, but of changing 
circumstances and of Chinese officials’ changing understanding of how foreign policy 
could aid China’s own internal development.
9
2. Mao Zedong: Ideology in the Lead
On October 1,1949 at the creation of the PRC, Mao Zedong, declared that “the 
Chinese people have stood up.”10 Unfortunately for the Chinese people, while Mao had 
been able to rally and lead Chinese communist forces in battle, he would prove unable to 
lead China to prosperity. Over the next 30 years Mao implemented numerous disastrous 
policies which left China in many ways even poorer and more isolated by the time of his 
death in 1976 than it had been in 1949. As Lau Nai-keung noted in 2008, in retrospect 
Mao’s 1949 declaration that the Chinese people had stood up “sounded somewhat hollow, 
like a statement of intent.”11 Indeed throughout Mao’s reign, China remained 
comparatively weak as an international power.
Mao was the head of the first generation of CPC leadership, or as they are 
sometimes called the “Long March Veterans,” survivors of the long military conflict from 
1927 through 1949 between the Chinese Communists led by Mao and the Chinese 
Nationalists, also referred to as Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai Shek. Mao was 
one of the founders of both the CPC and the PRC and served as Chairman of the CPC 
from 1945 till his death in 1976. He was also the leader of the PRC from its founding in 
1949 until his death in 1976, although there were challenges to his leadership in between. 
Chinese foreign policy under Mao, like most CPC policies at the time, was largely 
ideologically driven, fueled by the revolutionary zeal of the recently victorious CPC. 
During this first generation of PRC leadership, almost all Chinese officials were veterans
10 Mao Zedong, “Opening Address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference: ‘The Chinese People Have Stood Up!”’ September 21,1949, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm.
11 Lau Nai-keung, “The Chinese People Have Truly Stood Up.”
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of the Chinese Civil War and World War n. Having defeated both the Japanese and the 
Kuomintang in China, Mao and other CPC members sought to spread their revolution 
across the globe. As journalist and China scholar Joshua Kurlantzick stated, Mao sought 
to “not only create a revolutionary society at home, but also to foment armed revolution 
around the world, helping nations rid themselves of colonial masters and capitalist 
systems.”12 During Mao’s rule, China’s foreign policy consisted largely of supporting 
various foreign communist or revolutionary causes and insurgencies as what Mao called 
“righteous struggles.”13 In his 1956 address to the opening session of the Eighth 
Congress of the CPC, Mao told his fellow CPC members “we must give active support to 
the national independence and liberation movements in countries in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.”14 At Mao’s direction, China provided support to a communist 
insurgency in Burma, the Khmer Rouge group in Cambodia, revolutionary movements in 
Latin America, anti-government guerillas in Africa, and communist insurgencies in 
Yemen and Oman.15 Unlike the China of the 1990s and 2000s, where the focus was 
primarily on economic growth and ideology was generally a secondary consideration, 
under Mao political and ideological concerns outweighed economic ones, including in the 
realm of foreign policy. As Chinese foreign policy expert Jianwei Wang put it, “Maoist 
diplomacy in the Third World in general and African countries in particularly [sic] was 
largely sustained by the ideological doctrine of supporting the movement of national 
liberation and promoting world revolution.”16 As part of this policy, Mao portrayed
12 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 12-13.
13 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 13-14.
14 Quotations from Mao Tse Tung: Chapter 5. War and Peace, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch05.htm.
15 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 13-14.
16 Jianwei Wang, “China's New Frontier Diplomacy,” in “Harmonious World” and China's New Foreign
11
China as a leader of the Third World, leading the fight against colonial capitalist powers. 
In 1955, for example, a delegation of several senior Chinese officials, including Chinese 
Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, attended the Bandung Conference in 
Indonesia, a meeting of newly independent African and Asian nations organized by South 
East Asian states, and often credited for bringing about the Non-Alignment movement. 
While Zhou generally struck a moderate tone, the Chinese delegation used the conference 
to emphasize China’s and the other nations’ common colonial pasts as part of an effort to
1 7portray China as a leader of the Third World.
Despite Mao’s vision of supporting “righteous struggles” against colonial and 
capitalist powers around the world, by the middle of the 1970s most of the communist 
revolutions or insurgencies which Mao had supported had failed and China’s support for 
these groups had angered many foreign governments and alienated China from an entire 
generation of foreign officials. China became somewhat of a pariah in international 
relations as leaders in Asia, Africa, and Latin America severed ties with the PRC, drew 
closer to the U. S., and created regional organizations to counter China.18 Throughout the 
1970s and even some of the 1980s, China was largely isolated, and Chinese diplomats 
were generally inexperienced at dealing with other nations. During Mao’s rule, Chinese 
diplomats, like most Chinese, were also fearful that any deviation from the party line 
would result in harsh consequences and therefore stuck to reading pre-written statements 
and were largely ineffective at communicating with the rest of the world.19 As 
Kurlantzick put it, “the public face Beijing presented to the world was blunt and gray, just
Policy, edited by Jean-Marc F. Blanphard and Sujian Guo (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 27.
17 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 12-13.
18 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 14.
19 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 15.
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monotone statements from official spokesmen who understood nothing about the modem 
media.”20
CPC officials’ memories of Western support for groups opposing the CPC prior to 
1949, combined with the radical communist ideology which dominated China under 
Mao, as well as continuing conflicts between China and the West, also led Chinese 
officials to be suspicious of foreign nations’ intentions and of the Western-dominated 
international system. Prior to the founding of the PRC, during World War n, the U.S. had 
supported the Kuomintang as the recognized government within China. The U.S.’ goal in 
China during World War II had primarily been to support Chinese forces against invading 
Japanese forces. While the U.S. was suspicious of the CPC, the official U.S. policy at the 
time was non-intervention in the Chinese Civil War. It encouraged both the Kuomintang 
and the CPC to form a coalition government and even helped negotiate a temporary 
cease-fire between the two groups in 1946. However, the Kuomintang was able to use 
U.S. loans as well as U.S. supplied ammunition and weaponry against the CPC in the 
ongoing fighting between the two sides from 1946 to 1949. Further adding to CPC 
officials’ distrust of Western powers and the international system, in the 1950s the United 
Nations (UN) supported military intervention against Chinese-supported forces in the 
Korean War and until 1971 the exiled Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan, the 
Republic of China (ROC), rather than the PRC, still represented China at the UN. As a 
result, under Mao, Chinese officials generally rejected the current world order, and were 
skeptical of international and multilateral organizations, suspecting these organizations 
were a tool of Western powers designed to undermine the CPC. Up until 1971 China 
refused to join any international organization, and only joined the UN that year because
20 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 15.
13
Chinese officials believed it would help maintain “China’s self-independence and 
integrity of sovereignty.”21 As Zhongqi Pan, a Chinese academic, stated, China’s 
engagement with the rest of the world under Mao was largely “passive, negative, and 
defiant.” As noted above, most Chinese officials under Mao were military veterans of 
the Chinese Civil War and of World War II and had directly experienced fighting against 
foreign influence in China; either in the form of the invading Japanese or the U.S.- 
supported Kuomintang. Therefore, when it came to foreign policy during the 1950s and 
1960s, most CPC officials were primarily concerned with protecting China’s sovereignty. 
Most Chinese officials during this period also had little to no experience in international 
diplomacy or dealing with foreign nations other than in combat. As a result they were 
more likely to advocate military solutions to foreign policy issues than diplomatic ones. 
Not surprisingly then, according to a study of the PRC’s changing engagement with the 
rest of the world by Zhongqi Pan, most armed conflicts involving the PRC took place in 
this initial period of interaction with the international system under Mao and this first 
generation of CPC officials 23
Meanwhile, Mao’s misguided economic and cultural policies wreaked havoc on 
the Chinese economy and society, leaving China poor and its population traumatized. In 
1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, an economic campaign which attempted to 
catapult China from an agrarian economy to a modem communist society, in effect 
skipping the industrialization stage deemed necessary for the development of a 
communist society under Marxist theory. Mao attempted to accomplish this through
21 Zhongqi Pan, “China's Changing Image of and Engagement in World Order,” in “Harmonious World” 
and China's New Foreign Policy, edited by Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Sujian Guo (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2008), 49.
22 Zhongqi Pan, 49.
23 Zhongqi Pan, 46.
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rapid industrialization and collectivization. Under these polices Chinese citizens were not 
allowed to operate private farms and many were forced to use furnaces in their backyards 
to make steel (which Mao had decided was a pillar of a modem industrial economy) from 
scrap metal. These efforts were disastrous and resulted in negative growth and 
insufficient grain production, leading to massive famines. Between 18 and 45 million 
people died as a result of famines during the Great Leap Forward. By 1962 the effort had 
been exposed as an unmitigated disaster and Mao began to lose some of his power within 
the CPC.
In May 1966, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution partially as 
an attempt to reassert his power following his failed economic policies in the Great Leap 
Forward. The stated purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to eliminate Western and 
capitalist influences and institute “continuous revolution.” Students and young people 
were encouraged to take an active role in the revolution and to form groups to destroy 
Western and capitalist influences. Many prominent Chinese were labeled as “counter­
revolutionaries” and arrested, put to hard labor, imprisoned, or even executed.
Eventually the movement spiraled completely out of control, and the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) had to step in to restore national order.
As Chinese citizens grew tired of the revolutionary excesses of the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, they also grew weary of supporting overseas 
revolutionary efforts, especially when so much of China’s own society and economy had 
been devastated by Mao’s excesses. Unlike the 2000s when many countries would look 
at China as a model of economic success, under Mao, China was a prime example of how 
not to run an economy. As Kurlantzick noted, in terms of Chinese foreign policy options
15
under Mao, “apart from trying to export revolution, China's other tools of influence 
remained weak...[and] as an example of economic success, China seemed a model few 
countries would want to follow.”24 The result was a China which was both impoverished 
at home and isolated internationally. Chow Chung-yan, the news editor at the South 
China Morning Post put it bluntly: “in the 1960s and early 1970s, China was on a worse 
footing diplomatically and strategically than any other country in the world.”25
There was one important exception to China’s isolation under Mao’s rule. In the 
1970s, China sought to improve, and ultimately reestablish, relations with the U.S. in 
what became known as “rapprochement.” As The Economist noted, despite Mao’s 
mistrust of outside powers’ intentions, “political rapprochement with the West--a key part 
of [China’s later] ‘opening’—began several years before Mao’s death, driven by a shared 
dislike of the Soviet Union.”26 In the wake of major Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, 
Chinese leaders began to consider improving relations with the U.S. In 1971, U.S. 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger made two trips (the first was initially secret) 
to China to meet with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss reestablishing relations 
between the U.S. and China. These visits paved the way for U.S. President Richard 
Nixon’s famous 1972 trip to China and the eventual normalizing of U.S.-China relations 
in 1979 under U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Despite Mao’s failures in most other aspects 
of foreign policy, these meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders were a major turning 
point for China’s relations with the U.S. and served as the foundation for Deng’s later 
“opening up” strategy, which encouraged even more relations with the West.
24 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 14.
25 Chow Chung-yan, “Diplomatic Strategy Paves the Way for China's Rise,” South China Morning Post, 
December 18,2008.
26 “The Second Long March: China's Reforms,” The Economist (U.S. Edition), December 13,2008.
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3. Deng Xiaoping: Focus Inward and Keep a Low Profile
Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, a former colleague of Mao who 
had previously held high level positions within the PRC, but had been banished to the 
countryside and forced into hard labor in the late 1960s during the chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution, was “rehabilitated” and in a stunning series of political maneuvers was able 
to gradually take hold of power inside the CPC. Deng is considered the leader of the 
second generation of PRC leadership and was the effective leader of the CPC and the 
PRC from 1978 until the early 1990s. Deng is also generally regarded as the father of the 
more moderate policies of the PRC and the economic reforms that China adopted in the 
post-Mao era. He is widely credited as the leader who put China on a path to economic 
development and an “opening up” policy which allowed, among other things, greater 
foreign investment in China, while maintaining strict political control. These economic 
reforms helped lead to over thirty years of unprecedented economic growth. Between 
1978 and 2005 the Chinese economy grew at an average rate of 9.5 percent per year -  
“making it by far the world’s best performer” and eventually bringing “staggering
97changes to China’s international standing.”
While Mao’s disastrous policies had left China poor and isolated, their excesses and 
total failure actually made Deng’s rise, and the subsequent reforms he instituted, possible. 
After all, “the pragmatic Deng had seen the excesses and chaos of the Chairman’s 
policies firsthand,” particularly when Deng himself was sent to the countryside for hard 
labor.28 Although Deng was also a Long March veteran and believed strongly in the
27 Chow Chung-yan.
28 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 16.
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CPC’s ultimate authority, having personally experienced the turmoil and suffering which
characterized Mao’s rule, he was determined to put China on a more stable path of
development. Most Chinese welcomed Deng’s less ideological stance and more
moderate policies after the trauma of Mao’s chaotic reign. As Kurlantzick put it
Deng’s pragmatism resonated with a society recovering from Mao. The 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when hundreds of thousands of people were 
purged to the countryside or killed, and teachers and other intellectuals were 
terrorized by waves of ideological Red Guards, had shocked the Chinese 
population. Average Chinese had seen power and ideology wielded by the 
state bring nothing but misery to average people; now they remained weary 
from decades of this internal turmoil.29
Given their experience with this turmoil and suffering under Mao, many Chinese
(including many CPC officials) were willing to reevaluate China’s domestic and foreign
policy following Mao’s passing. As Chow Chung-yan put it “when Deng Xiaoping came
back to power from political exile after Mao’s death in 1976, Beijing was ready to
O A
reassess the global situation and redraw its grand strategy.”
Deng recognized that Mao’s policies had not only created turmoil at home, but 
that his support for communist insurgencies around the world had isolated China abroad 
and drained its treasury.31 As Kurlantzick noted, “Deng understood how Maoism had 
alienated China’s neighbors, created instability on China’s borders, and impoverished 
China itself.”32 Deng ended Mao’s policies of supporting foreign communist 
revolutionary forces and insurgencies and sought to improve relations with many of the 
countries these groups had targeted.33 Deng also sought to continue to improve relations 
with the U.S. Aside from the benefits of not having an adversarial relationship with one
29 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17.
30 Chow Chung-yan.
31 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17.
32 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 16.
33 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17.
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of the world’s superpowers, Deng believed that in order to jumpstart its own internal 
development China would need to be able to import technology from more advanced 
countries such as the U.S. Thus under Deng, the U.S. became an important source of 
technology for China, a key component of Deng’s plans to develop and modernize the 
Chinese economy.34
Deng took a long view of China’s situation and believed the nation would need 
several decades to recover from the trauma of Mao’s policies and to develop 
economically. International conflict, however, was always a looming threat during the 
Cold War, and Deng believed that if such a conflict broke out, China would likely 
become embroiled in the crisis and that this would distract China from its need to focus 
on economic development. He therefore argued that China’s primary foreign policy goal 
should be to advocate for a peaceful and stable international environment, which in turn 
would allow China to focus inward on its own internal economic development. Deng 
often publicly repeated this message of his desire for a stable and peaceful international 
environment so China could focus on its own development. On February 22, 1984, in 
Beijing, while speaking to a delegation from the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies of Georgetown University, Deng told the group “we need at least twenty years of 
peace to concentrate on our domestic development.”35 When the President of Brazil 
visited Beijing in May 1984, Deng further emphasized these views saying, “we are now 
devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to the modernization of our country, and therefore we
34 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17.
35 Deng Xiaoping, “A New Approach Towards Stabilizing the World Situation” (discussions with a 
delegation from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown University, in 
Beijing, China, February 22,1984), as recorded in Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing, 
China: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), 42.
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sincerely hope that no war will break out and that peace will be long-lasting.”36 Similarly 
on October 26,1984, when the President of the Maldives visited China, Deng stated “we 
need a peaceful international environment to ensure our development.”37
Deng also realized that China was far behind developed nations in terms of both 
available capital and technology. He recognized that by isolating itself from the West and 
the rest of the world, China had fallen behind economically. Deng therefore argued that 
in order for China to recover and to develop it would need foreign investment and 
technology. As Kurlantzick notes, Deng not only believed that “China would need 
decades to recover, and would require a peaceful external environment” but that it would 
also require “massive inflows of foreign investment and technology to become strong.” 
Beginning in 1978 Deng opened China up to joint foreign ventures and allowed the 
creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in order to encourage an injection of foreign 
capital into the Chinese economy. SEZs were regions with more liberal and open 
economic policies intended to encourage foreign investment and international trade.
These regions had less restrictive economic and tax policies than other regions of China 
and were generally more open to foreign companies and capitalist market forces, with the
39goal of attracting foreign businesses to invest and create jobs in China. During a
symposium on China’s economic co-operation with foreign countries in October 1984, 
Deng explained his rationale behind opening China up to foreign investment and trade:
36 Deng Xiaoping, “Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development” (talk with President Joao 
Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo of Brazil, in Beijing, China, May 29, 1984), as recorded in 
Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), 47.
37 Deng Xiaoping, “We Should Follow Our Own Road Both in Revolution and in Economic 
Development” (speech with President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Republic of Maldives, in 
Beijing, China, October 26,1984), as recorded in Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing, 
China: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), 84.
38 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 16.
39 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 16.
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While invigorating the domestic economy, we have also formulated a policy 
of opening up to the outside world. Reviewing our history, we have 
concluded that one of the most important reasons for China’s long years of 
stagnation and backwardness was its policy of closing the country to outside 
contact. Our experience shows that China cannot rebuild itself with its doors 
closed to the outside and that it cannot develop in isolation from the rest of 
the world.40
Deng believed that foreign investment and the ability to import foreign technology would 
be essential to a more rapid Chinese recovery. An unstable international environment or 
conflict would therefore not only hurt China by distracting it from its own economic 
development, but would also limit vital foreign investment in China and hamper China’s 
ability to import technology, further delaying China’s modernization efforts.
Overall, Deng believed that China was currently too poor and weak to focus on 
international affairs. Given the enormity of the task of China’s own internal economic 
development, Deng believed China could not afford to focus on external matters. As 
Chow Chung-yan stated, “Deng knew China had to marshal all of its resources to lift the 
nation out of poverty and this dictated that the nation must keep peace with all its 
neighbours.”41 Taking a more active role on the world stage would consume energy and 
resources which China could not afford to spare at this point in its history. This was a 
shift from Mao, who had sought to play up China’s memory of being subjugated and 
portrayed China as leading the fight against Western and capitalist powers. While some 
Chinese still wished for China to act more forcefully, Deng advised restraint. As 
Kurlantzick noted,
Deng counseled his proud countrymen, heirs to a Chinese kingdom that once
40 Deng Xiaoping, “The Magnificent Goal of Our Four Modernizations, and our Basic Policies” (interview 
with Chinese and foreign delegates to a symposium on China’s economic co-operation with foreign 
countries, October 6,1984), as recorded in Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing, China: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1987), 69.
41 Chow Chung-yan.
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called itself the center of the world, to bide their time. China should ‘keep a 
low profile’ and never take the lead on global issues, Deng warned—Beijing 
wasn’t strong enough to expose itself to a world leadership role.42
In the late 1980s, Deng began to formulate what would become known as his “tao guang
yang hui,” or “lay-low approach,” which as Chow Chung-yan noted as recently as 2008
“would become the [primary] guiding principle for China’s foreign policy to this day.”43
In the early 1990s, Deng’s theories on Chinese foreign policy gradually evolved into what
became known as the “24 Character Strategy,” which would stand as “the guiding
maxim” for China’s approach to international affairs. The “24 Character Strategy” can be
translated as
Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our 
capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never 
claim leadership.44
As the architect of the reforms which saved China following the disaster of Mao’s 
policies, Deng’s guidance had a profound impact on multiple generations of Chinese 
officials from the late 1970s to today. Following Deng’s advice, from the late 1970s up 
until even the early 1990s China generally played a passive role in the international 
system. As C. Fred Bergsten, former Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the 
U.S. Treasury Department and a China expert, noted, during Deng’s rule Chinese officials 
“commonly demurred that [China] did not seek international or regional leadership and 
simply sought to focus on its own internal development over the next generation or
42 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 16.
43 Chow Chung-yan.
44 Deng Xiaoping as quoted in C. Fred Bergsten et al. China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, 209. 
U.S Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2007,” “Chapter 2: ‘Understanding China's Strategy,”” 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf and 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2007/2007-prc-military-power02.htm.
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more.”45 Kurlantzick and David Lampton, the Director of China Studies at the Paul H. 
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), argued that, in the realm of 
foreign affairs, under Deng, China “played defense, reacting when threatened but 
generally avoiding most global issues.”46 Chow Chung-yan similarly summarized 
Deng’s foreign policy as “avoid engaging in controversial issues, develop good- 
neighbourly relationships and focus on nurturing strength through trade and foreign
, , 4 7investment.
Although Deng advised opening China up more to the West, Chinese officials, 
including Deng, were still largely skeptical of political and security multilateral 
organizations. As Kai He, an expert on Chinese foreign policy and engagement with 
multilateral institutions, noted, “China’s [late 20th century] diplomatic history suggests 
that [prior to the 1990s] China was largely a target of multilateral security institutions led 
by the two superpowers” and as a result “China’s policy toward multilateral institutions,” 
much like its foreign policy in general, “was passive and reluctant during the Cold 
War.”48 China’s reluctance to become involved in multilateral organizations also 
reflected Deng’s concern that these organizations could entangle China in conflicts which 
would distract from its internal development. Nevertheless, China gradually joined more 
multilateral organizations under Deng than it had under Mao, largely as a means to 
further China’s economic development. In 1971, China only belonged to one
ft
intergovernmental organization (IGO), the UN. By 1976 this number had risen to 21, and
45 Bergsten et al., 209.
46 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17. David M. Lampton, The Making o f Chinese Foreign and Security 
Policy in the Era o f Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
47 Chow Chung-yan.
48 Kai He, “China's Peaceful Rise and Multilateral Institutions: In Search of a Harmonious World,” in 
“Harmonious World” and China's New Foreign Policy, edited by Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Sujian 
Guo (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 67.
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by 1989 China belonged to 37 IGOs.49 Under Deng China primarily joined multilateral 
organizations which Chinese officials believed would aid China’s economic 
development. For example, in 1980 China joined both the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank. Likewise in 1986 China joined the Asian Development Bank 
and applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a founding 
member.50
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, however, Chinese officials still did not take part 
in many political or security multilateral organizations, other than attending UN sessions, 
where Chinese officials often abstained from voting.51 Unlike the 2000s when China 
would not be afraid to oppose Western sponsored actions, under Deng in the 1980s and 
early 1990s Chinese diplomats at the UN rarely voiced any opinion. This was partly 
due to China’s general policy of non-interference or non-intervention, which argued that 
no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another country. China proclaimed 
non-interference as its policy (in words if not always in actions) as far back as late 1953 
when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, proposed the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence” during negotiations between China and India. The “Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence” were: “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” China’s non-interference policy served 
several purposes. First it served as a principled defensive policy, arguing against any 
potential attempts by foreign powers to interfere inside China. The policy also, however,
49 Zhongqi Pan, 47.
50 Zhongqi Pan, 48.
51 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17.
52 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 17.
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helped Chinese officials argue that China was not a threat to other countries, and would 
not seek to interfere in their affairs, a common concern among foreign officials following 
Mao’s initial support for communist revolutionary groups and insurgencies around the 
world. Under Deng, China’s non-interference policy also provided China with an 
ideological reason to avoid becoming involved in most international issues. During a 
visit with the Prime Minister of Canada in July 1990, Deng explicitly reiterated both the 
internal and international aspects of this policy saying “China will never accept 
interference by other countries in its internal affairs...The key principle governing the 
new international order should be noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs and 
social systems.”53
Deng’s guidance that China should keep a low profile and Chinese officials’ 
general reluctance to voice opinions on international political or security matters during 
the 1970s and 1980s should also be understood in the context of the international 
environment at the time. During this time period most international relations were 
dominated by the Cold War in which two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, 
often battled one another through surrogates and attempted to amass expanding spheres 
of influence across the globe. Chinese officials, including Deng, in the 1970s and 1980s 
painted China as a neutral party unaligned with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. The 
Chinese historical memory of what Chinese refer to as the “Century of Humiliation” 
featured prominently in Chinese officials’ thinking. The “Century of Humiliation” was a 
concept popularized by both the Kuomintang and the CPC which referred to the period of
53 Deng Xiaoping, “China Will Never Allow Others to Interfere in Internal Affairs,” (speech with Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau, former Prime Minister of Canada, in Beijing, China, July 11, 1990), as quoted in The 
China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cpc2011/2010-09/15/content_12474319_ll.htm. See 
also the CPC Encyclopedia, http://www.cpcchina.org/2010-09/15/content_13918109_ll.htm.
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roughly 1839 to 1949 during which time China lost its sovereignty to various foreign 
powers (Western colonial powers, the Japanese, etc.). The “Century of Humiliation’s” 
start is usually placed at the beginning of the First Opium War in 1839. Over the next 
100 years China lost numerous battles to a variety of foreign powers (for example: the 
Second Opium War, the Sino-French War, the First Sino-Japanese War), and was forced 
to give major concessions to outside powers in subsequent treaties, sometimes referred to 
as the “Unequal Treaties.” Chinese communist forces in the 1940s played up this 
historical memory, arguing that the CPC was fighting to break China free from foreign 
influence. CPC officials further argued that the Communist Revolution in 1949 had 
finally achieved true independence and sovereignty for the Chinese people after a century 
of subjugation to outside powers. Many members of the second generation of PRC 
leadership like Deng grew up during the “Centuiy of Humiliation” and personally 
remembered that sense of being subject to outside powers. As such, Deng and other CPC 
officials wanted to avoid what they viewed as a similar subservient relationship to either 
the U.S. or the Soviet Union. Throughout his rule, Deng repeatedly spoke of China’s 
opposition to hegemony, a thinly veiled critique of the system of the two superpowers.54 
While much of this opposition of “hegemony” was driven by Chinese officials’ fears that 
the U.S. or the Soviet Union would seek to interfere in what the CPC considered China’s 
internal affairs, as noted above Chinese officials also feared that the Cold War could turn 
“hot” at any moment and thus embroil the world in another world war. Given that Deng 
believed that China needed several decades of peace and a stable international 
environment to develop, he viewed the threat of such a conflict between the two
54 Deng Xiaoping, “Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development,” Fundamental Issues in 
Present-Day China, 46.
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superpowers as a not just a threat to international stability but also to China’s economic 
development. Deng therefore argued that the very existence of superpowers in the 
international system was dangerous. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in April 
1974, Deng made clear his dislike of the concept of superpowers and, as noted in the 
introduction, explicitly stated that “China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be 
one” and that if China ever did become a superpower “the people of the world 
should.. .expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow
Although Deng departed from most of Mao’s policies, as part of Deng’s opposition
to the system of the two superpowers he did continue to portray China as a leading
member of the Third World (in contrast to the First World or the Western World, and the
Second World or the Soviet Union). During the President of Brazil’s May 1984 visit to
Beijing, Deng articulated his views on the goals and practice of China’s foreign policy,
emphasizing China’s place in the Third World:
The foreign policy which China has been pursuing in the 1980s and will 
continue to pursue in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century can be 
summed up in two sentences: First, we oppose hegemony in order to 
safeguard world peace. Second, China will always belong to the Third 
World, and this position is a foundation of our foreign policy. It means that 
China, being a poor country, belongs to the Third World as a matter of course, 
that it shares a common destiny with all Third World countries and that it will 
remain one of them even when it becomes prosperous and powerful, because 
China will never seek hegemony or bully others, but will always side with the 
Third World.56
During his meetings with the President of the Maldives in 1984, Deng again argued that
55 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech By Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng 
Xiaoping, At the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly,” April 10,1974, 
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China was part of the Third World and repeated his assurance that China would never 
become a superpower saying, “we have said more than once that China belongs to the 
Third World. It will still belong to the Third World even in the future, after it is 
developed. China will never become a superpower.”57
Partially because of Deng’s more moderate policies and focus on “opening up,” 
the 1970s and 1980s were generally a positive time for China’s relations with the rest of 
the world. During this period China was able to take over the seat on the UN Security 
Council from the exiled Chinese Nationalist ROC government in Taiwan and normalized 
'relations with the U.S. and several other countries. Western nations were also 
increasingly curious about China and hopeful that Deng’s reforms would lead to 
improved relations. Compared to the ideological and revolutionary Mao, the pragmatic 
and reform-minded Deng seemed like a leader Western nations might be able to work 
with. U.S. President Gerald Ford followed former President Nixon’s example and visited 
China in 1975, and due to Mao’s failing health, Ford primarily met with then Vice 
Premier Deng. Deng’s policies of opening China to foreign investment also appeared to 
be providing rapid results when in 1978 Coca Cola announced their plans to open a 
factory in Shanghai and Boeing announced their plans to sell 747 aircraft to Chinese 
airlines. In 1979 Deng made an official visit to the U.S. where he met with U.S.
President Carter, former President Nixon, and several U.S. congressmen. During this trip 
Deng also emphasized the importance of opening China up to foreign investment and 
technology, visiting the Johnson Space Center in Houston, the Coca-Cola Company 
headquarters in Atlanta, and the Boeing headquarters in Seattle. Meanwhile, back in
57 Deng Xiaoping, “We Should Follow Our Own Road Both in Revolution and in Economic 
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China Deng’s reforms continued to expand the Chinese economy and attract foreign 
investment. In 1984 U.S. President Ronald Reagan visited China, where Reagan and 
Deng agreed to more scientific and cultural changes, increased trade, and a nuclear 
cooperation agreement. In the early to mid 1980s China also had two diplomatic 
breakthroughs with the West regarding territorial claims. In 1984 China signed a joint 
declaration with Great Britain in which the British agreed to transfer sovereignty of Hong 
Kong to the Chinese in 1997, and in 1987 Chinese officials reached an agreement with 
Portugal to transfer sovereignty of Macao to China in 1999.58 In Februaiy 1989 U.S. 
President George H. W. Bush, who had been the Chief of the US Liaison Office in the 
PRC under former U.S. President Ford, made a “working visit” to China, and generally 
advocated for closer relations between China and the U.S. However, despite all of these 
positive developments and the general warming of relations between China and the West, 
as Chow Chung-yan noted, “China’s honeymoon with the West was soon to end.”59
58 Chow Chung-yan.
59 Chow Chung-yan.
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4.1989-1990: Tiananmen Square, International Isolation, the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and Their Effects on Chinese Officials
In the spring and summer of 1989 a series of protests by students, intellectuals, 
and laborers, all arguing for increased political reforms, occurred in Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing. As the protests escalated the CPC used the PLA to brutally crackdown on the 
participants. According to many reports the PLA opened fire on unarmed protesters and 
in the ensuing violence between 200 and 2,000 protesters were killed and many others 
were injured or arrested. The PLA’s harsh response to the protests at Tiananmen Square 
showed that there was a limit to the reforms Deng was willing to implement. While 
Deng had advocated economic reforms and opening China up to the rest of the world to 
attract foreign investment, political reform was another issue. The CPC remained the 
sole power in China and any challenge to that authority would not be tolerated.
The Chinese government’s harsh reaction to potential challenges to CPC authority
also led to a purge of some more liberal CPC officials. Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary
of the CPC, had advocated a softer response to the Tiananmen Square protests and later
made conciliatory statements to students about the government’s actions. Following
these statements, he was removed from his position of General Secretary and placed
under house arrest. As scholar Bruce Gilley pointed out, in the tense political climate
after Tiananmen Square, it became clear that
the new General Secretary would have to be someone in a central 
government or party department who had played no role in the Beijing 
crackdown, or a local leader whose handling of the students was deemed
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moderate.60
Jiang Zemin fit the bill on both counts. During the tumultuous events of Tiananmen, 
according to Gilley, “Jiang remained out of sight...[and] in the end, his caution was well 
rewarded.”61 He had been largely absent during the PLA’s crackdown on the Tiananmen 
Square protests, and he had been “distinguished by his attempts at moderation in 
handling” student protests in Shanghai in 1986 and 1989 when he was the mayor of 
Shanghai and the CPC Party Chief in Shanghai. Jiang was named the new General 
Secretary of the CPC on June 24, 1989, becoming the center of the third generation of 
PRC leadership, and almost immediately had to face the international fallout following 
Tiananmen Square.
The PRC's harsh and violent response to the Tiananmen Square protests was 
greeted with almost universal international condemnation and led to a nearly global 
embargo.63 Many Western nations, including the U.S., curtailed interactions with China 
and/or implemented sanctions. Prior to the Tiananmen Square protests, U.S. President 
George H. W. Bush had been pushing for a closer relationship between the U.S. and 
China. Following the PLA’s crackdown on the protestors, however, Bush suspended all 
military and high-level contacts between the U.S. and China and said that the he would 
pressure the World Bank to suspend new loans to China.64 In addition all Chinese 
students were allowed to extend their U.S. visas indefinitely.
The same year as the events at Tiananmen, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and a series
60 Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite (Berkeley, CA: University of 
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of revolutions against communist governments spread across Eastern Europe, eventually 
leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union by 1991. Mikhail Gorbachev, the 
General Secretary of the Soviet Union, had attempted to enact a series of economic and 
political reforms, and as a result opened the floodgates to change. The events of 1989, 
1990, and 1991 had a profound impact upon an entire generation of Chinese leaders 
including Jiang. Having just experienced their own popular protests, Chinese officials 
were shaken by the subsequent collapse of communist governments throughout Eastern 
Europe. The fall of the Soviet Union sparked fierce debate among Chinese leaders over 
how the PRC could avoid a similar fate.65 Jiang viewed the developments in the Soviet 
Union with great trepidation, and in Gilley’s view, was determined not to be “China's 
Gorbachev.”66 After Tiananmen, Jiang and many other Chinese leaders adhered to a 
“philosophy of combining political control with economic freedom” as they sought to
i f n  *
avoid the mistakes they thought the Soviets had made. Following Deng’s example, the 
third generation of PRC leadership continued to reform and open up China’s economy 
but resisted any attempts at political reform.
The fall of the Soviet Union also left the U.S. as the world’s only remaining 
superpower. As the Soviet Union’s collapse came right on the heels of Western outrage 
and the nearly global embargo of China over Tiananmen, Chinese officials worried that 
with communism defeated in Europe and Russia, the U.S. and its allies would turn their 
attention towards China, the last major communist power, which had just brutally 
suppressed its own people. Chinese officials had witnessed how the U.S. and its Western 
allies had earlier used alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to
65 “The Second Long March: China's Reforms,” The Economist.
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isolate the Soviet Union, ultimately contributing to its collapse. Chinese officials worried 
that the U.S. and its Western allies would create similar alliance structures around China 
and seek to isolate and eventually dismantle the PRC. The first Gulf War against Iraq in 
1990 and 1991 also made a strong impression on Chinese officials. Chinese leaders and 
scholars saw how the U.S. and its allies were able to form an international coalition to 
take on Iraq and were surprised by how easily the U.S. was able to defeat Saddam 
Hussein’s forces. As a result many Chinese officials realized that despite the past decade 
of relatively sustained economic development, there was still no way China could 
compete with the high-tech weaponry in the U.S. arsenal. As Former Time magazine 
foreign editor and China expert Joshua Cooper Ramo noted:
starting with the first Gulf War, Beijing’s military and international affairs 
establishment began to be quite nervous about the problem of Chinese 
security. It was clear that China had emerged from the Cold War with a 
military apparatus vastly inferior to that of the United States. The kinds of 
high-tech combined-arms tactics the Chinese saw on CNN in the early 1990s 
were both mystifying and not a little worrisome. Some of the ideas contained 
in U.S. battle doctrine did not even have descriptions in the Chinese 
language.68
Chinese officials, already historically fearful of foreign interference in China, became 
even more concerned that the U.S. might turn its attention to China next. As Ramo 
stated, for Chinese leaders “the implicit message of Gulf I and later the U.S.-led Balkans 
wars was that military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was one of the 
dividends [for the U.S.] of a world without a dynamic superpower balance.”69 Ramo 
further argued that Chinese leaders believed that the U.S.’ technological advantage had 
made “power-projection easier than in the past” and that the U.S.’s new ability to
68 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London, UK: The Foreign Policy Centre, May 2004), 42- 
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intervene in conflicts around the world “was worrisome to Beijing.”70 The Gulf War and 
the realization that China was so technologically inferior to the U.S. “reflected CCP 
leaders’ worst fears about national defense and touched on the deepest strains of 
nationalism, a sensitivity to foreign military superiority that reached back to the Opium 
Wars.”71 Having seen the U.S.’ vast military and technological superiority, Chinese 
policy makers realized that China would “be unable to develop military resources to 
compete symmetrically with the United States for a long time, perhaps as long as 50 
years.”72
All of these developments led to an extremely hostile international environment 
for China at the beginning of Jiang’s rule. As Chow Chung-yan noted, in 1989 and 1990 
“China was isolated, feared and encircled diplomatically and strategically” and, 
according to China scholar Richard Hu, China’s relations with the West had “almost 
reversed to the Cultural Revolution period.”73 This isolation had a profound effect on 
new generations of Chinese leaders and officials. While, as a result of Deng’s reforms, 
the third and fourth generations of CPC officials were more likely to have been exposed 
to the West, they now had also experienced how “Western nations shunfed] China after 
the Tiananmen crackdown.”74 This isolation came at a time when the Chinese economy 
was increasingly dependent on the West for investment and technology. Unlike under 
Mao, when China’s economy was isolated (although stagnant and even contracting), 
following Deng’s reforms China’s economy was more open to the world than ever before. 
Much of China’s recent economic growth had been the result of its ability to attract
70 Ramo, 42-43.
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foreign investment, technology, and resources to China. Chinese officials further knew
that as the Chinese economy continued to grow it could not rely on domestic natural
resources for all its energy and production needs. China would increasingly need to
import sources of energy and raw materials from around the world. At the same time, the
Chinese economy was also increasingly dependent on the ability to sell Chinese goods in
markets overseas. Without access to foreign markets, Chinese manufacturers would be
unable to sell their goods and the Chinese economy would suffer. Prior to Tiananmen,
relations with the Western world had been improving, and China’s economy was growing
thanks in part to a new flood of Western investment and technology. After Tiananmen,
however, Chinese officials realized that not only could the West stop providing this
technology quickly, but that the U.S. and other Western nations dominated the
international system and had created a series of alliances they could use to cut China off
from natural resources and overseas markets. Chinese officials therefore viewed the
isolation Western countries imposed on China after Tiananmen as a significant threat to
China’s continued economic development and began to debate how China could avoid
such isolation in the future. Zhang Xizhen, a professor of international relations at
Beijing University, confirmed this saying:
Threatened and actual economic sanctions and international political isolation 
[after Tiananmen] jeopardized our opening up and reform process. [We had] 
to strengthen relations with our neighbors and break out of the Western 
blockade.75
Younger generations of Chinese officials began to understand that as a rising power, 
China’s fate was far more dependent upon its access to the international economy than
75 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 32. Sangwon Suh and David Hsieh, “From Suspicion to Trust: Why 
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ever before. These new generations of Chinese leaders realized that
China had pressing great-power needs—needs for oil, allies, markets, and 
security, among others. Yet the United States had built alliances around the 
world that could constrain China one day if Washington chose to contain 
Beijing the way it had tried to contain Moscow and if nations agreed to join 
in that effort.76
In order to maintain access to oil and markets in the context of post-Tiananmen isolation 
by the West, Chinese officials and scholars argued that China would need to form better 
relations with developing nations so that China was not dependent solely on Western 
nations for trade, markets, and resources. Kurlantzick noted that Chinese officials 
explicitly told him that their experience after Tiananmen taught them that “Beijing could 
not rely on the United States but must develop its relations with its neighbors, with 
Africa, and with Latin America.”77 Argentina's president, Carlos Menem, was the first 
Western leader to visit China in the aftermath of Tiananmen. Such outreach and solidarity 
from developing nations further helped convince Chinese officials that the developing 
world could provide a more stable counter to the sometimes tense relationships between 
China and the West.78
The protests at Tiananmen had also showed Chinese officials that following the 
disaster of Mao’s communist revolutionary policies, and the success of Deng’s more 
moderate, even capitalist, economic reforms, that communism held declining value in 
China as a unifying ideology. As China continued to reform its economy and move more 
towards a state-directed capitalist society, Chinese officials began to realize that 
increasingly the CPC’s own internal political survival depended largely on its ability to 
deliver sustained economic growth. Thus Chinese officials had an even greater incentive
76 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 32.
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to develop a new foreign policy which would help China avoid or lessen the impact of 
potential future attempts to isolate the country and thus damage its economy
37
5. Jiang Zemin: Repairing Relations with the U.S. Post-Tiananmen
While Chinese officials began to debate how China could side-step potential 
attempts by the U.S. and Western allies to isolate China, they still recognized that good 
relations with the U.S (now the world’s sole superpower and previously a growing source 
of technology and investment for China) would be vital to improving China’s 
international standing and regaining access to world markets and resources, particularly 
in the near-term.79 Jiang and other Chinese officials believed that in order for China to 
continue to grow in power and stature, they would need the U.S. to accept the CPC’s 
power in China, or at least not actively work to overthrow or constrain it. Therefore, as 
Jianwei Wang stated, “during the Jiang era, Beijing's diplomacy was pretty much 
America-centered” and Jiang “following Deng Xiaoping’s advice...regarded China’s 
relations with the United States as a ‘priority within priority’”80 In 1990, soon after his 
elevation to General Secretary, Jiang conducted a series of interviews with various U.S. 
media outlets as part of an effort to convey a more amicable image of China to counter 
the negative attention surrounding Tiananmen.81 China’s relations with the U.S. were 
strained again, however, in 1992 when newly elected U.S. President Bill Clinton (who 
had accused, the previous U.S. President, George H.W. Bush, of “coddling the dictators 
in Beijing” during the U.S. presidential campaign) sought to take a tougher stance on 
China. Clinton wanted to link Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status for China to verifiable 
improvements on human rights. MFN status historically has referred to a trade 
agreement in which a nation will get the same concessions that any other nation is able to
79 Jianwei Wang, 26.
80 Jianwei Wang, 26.
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obtain in a trade agreement with a single given nation. More recently, in the U. S., MFN 
status has also been called “normal trade relations” (NTR) or “permanent normal trade 
relations” (PNTR). Under MFN or PNTR the U. S. grants its normal preferential trade 
treatment to a nation. For many years the U. S. had to annually renew China’s MFN 
status and tied its renewal to the freedom of emigration from China according to the 
Jackson-Vanik provision of the Trade Act of 1974. In the early 1990s, however, many 
U.S. officials, including several members of the U.S. Congress and officials in the new 
Clinton administration, also wanted to tie MFN renewal for China to progress on various 
human rights issues. In May 1993 Clinton signed an executive order officially linking 
the U.S.’s renewal of China’s MFN status to human rights progress. Predictably, Chinese 
officials strongly opposed this policy. Chinese leaders bristled at what they viewed as 
U.S interference in internal/domestic Chinese affairs. According to Xiaoxiong Yi, an 
expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy, from Beijing’s perspective, by attempting 
to link MFN to human rights, the U.S. had “abused interdependence and turned it against 
China’s independence.”82 As China’s economy continued to grow, Chinese officials had 
gained confidence in China’s status in the world, and began to believe that China, as a 
rising “great power” must “insist on being treated with due respect.”83 Jiang himself, as a 
new Chinese leader who was still coming out of Deng’s shadow, was in no position to 
compromise with American wishes in the MFN dispute, as “no Chinese leader could hope 
to succeed Deng Xiaoping after acquiescing to what would be seen as humiliating and 
intrusive demands by a foreign power.”84 On the other hand, Jiang believed that he
82 Xiaoxiong Yi, “China’s U.S. Policy Conundrum in the 1990s: Balancing Autonomy and 
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needed to continue to improve relations with the U.S. Jiang therefore attempted to 
continue his U.S. public relations offensive and took his case directly to the U.S. media. 
As Gilley noted,
In interviews with the U.S. media in early 1993, Jiang made it clear that the 
statements [regarding MFN status] had raised hackles in Beijing. ‘We favor 
dialogue and oppose the use of pressure in resolving bilateral differences over 
things like human rights,’ he told U.S. News & World Report in February.
‘We disapprove of exploiting the human rights issue to interfere in the 
internal affairs of other countries.’85
Jiang similarly told CNN in May 1993, “our differences can be settled through
dialogue.”86 Ultimately, Jiang and Chinese officials decided to make a number of trade,
weapons proliferation, and human rights concessions, including releasing several
prominent political dissidents and agreeing to discontinue jamming transmission of the
U.S. radio program “Voice of America” (VO A) into China, in order to convince the
Clinton administration to abandon its efforts to link China’s MFN status to human rights
• 87in China. Faced with these concessions and mounting pressure within the American 
business community, in 1994 President Clinton was forced to sign another executive 
order decoupling China’s MFN status from verifiable human rights progress in China.
Tensions between the U.S. and China continued during the early 1990s, however. 
In 1993 U.S. military forces boarded a Chinese cargo ship heading to Iran declaring they 
suspected the ship was carrying precursors for chemical weapons. No such chemicals 
were found, but the U.S. claimed it acted in good faith. In 1992 and 1993 China also 
made a bid to host the 2000 Olympics, which the U.S. Congress vehemently opposed. 
When the 2000 Olympics were ultimately awarded to Australia later in 1993, many
85 Gilley, 209.
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Chinese blamed the U.S. for leading the vote against China. Perhaps as a sign of the
tensions between the U.S. and China, during this same time period Jiang articulated a
new Chinese policy on relations with the U.S. In a 1993 meeting of Chinese military
leaders Jiang listed what would become known as the “Four Noes” or “sibu fangzhen”
policy. The basic tenets of the “Four Noes” were:
China does not want confrontation with the United States;
China will not provoke confrontation with the United States;
China will not avoid confrontation with the United States if the latter wants 
it;
and China does not fear confrontation with the United States.88 
While these events and the articulation of the “Four Noes” seemed to point towards 
increased tensions and even possible conflict between the U.S. and China, a breakthrough 
in U.S-China relations was about to occur.
On November 19, 1993, Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton met in a private meeting at 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Seattle, the first meeting of 
heads of state from China and the U.S. since Tiananmen. While this was a historic 
gathering at that time, little was accomplished at the meeting itself. Back in China,
OQ
however, the meeting was deemed “a roaring success” and was a triumph for Jiang. As 
Gilley noted, Jiang “had just presided over the official end of the post-Tiananmen freeze 
in Sino-U.S. relations” and laid the foundation for future summits between the U.S. and 
China.90 Jiang and Clinton met again in 1994 at the next APEC forum in Jakarta and 
agreed to “‘a new constructive relationship’ that would include high-level visits.”91 Soon 
after the 1994 APEC forum, however, U.S.-China relations deteriorated again over
88 Xiaoxiong Yi, 688.
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thdisagreements on Taiwan policy. A planned state visit by Jiang to New York on the 50 
anniversary of the UN in October 1995 was scaled back to a private meeting between 
Clinton and Jiang. Following tense conflicts with the U.S. over Taiwan in 1995 and
1996, many observers did not have high hopes for China’s relations with the U.S. and the 
West.
Somewhat surprisingly though, 1997 proved to be a good year for Jiang as he 
oversaw the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty from the British on June 30,
1997. Later that same year, on October 29,1997 Jiang and Clinton held a historic 
summit in Washington D.C. As Chow Chung-yan stated, Jiang’s 1997 official “visit to 
the U.S. marked the frill restoration of ties with western powers” and the end of China’s
Q9isolation following the Tiananmen Square crackdown. The visit was not without 
controversy, however. While in Washington, Jiang was greeted with protests over 
China’s handling of Tibet and China’s suppression of the spiritual/religious group Falun 
Gong. Falun Gong had grown rapidly in China since the early 1990s and had clashed 
with the CPC. Later, in April 1999, thousands of Falun Gong followers gathered at the 
CPC headquarters in Zhongnanhai to protest reported beatings and arrests of fellow 
members who had been protesting articles critical of the movement. In 1999 Jiang and 
the PRC leadership banned Falun Gong, issuing a statement calling it illegal and accusing 
it of inciting social unrest. Despite the protests in Washington in 1997 over Chinese 
policies towards Tibet and Falun Gong, in Gilley’s view, just attending the summit in 
Washington was “a personal triumph” for Jiang. During the summit and the 
maneuvering leading up to it China agreed to a number of provisions intended to bring it
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more in line with international norms and the international community. Before the
summit China had agreed to sign the UN covenant on economic, social, and cultural
rights, and invited religious representatives from the U.S. to visit China for talks on
increased religious freedom. At the summit Jiang agreed to “resume a human rights
dialogue with Washington.”94 The two nations agreed on a variety of economic
exchanges, limited tariffs on certain exports, and lifting the ban of the export of certain
technologies to China. At the summit Clinton and Jiang also agreed upon a “constructive
strategic partnership for the twenty-first century.” As Avery Goldstein, an expert on
Chinese politics and international relations, explained, the term “constructive strategic
partnership” was chosen to
indicate that the countries would work together to solve problems threatening 
peace and stability (thus, a partnership); underscore the significance of this 
bilateral relationship for broader regional and international security (thus, 
strategic); and distinguish it from the closer ties already in place with Russia 
(thus, the need to work on making strained bilateral relations more 
constructive).95
While the results of the summit on the U.S. side were difficult to assess, in China it was 
deemed an unabashed success. Jiang felt vindicated in his handling of U.S.-China 
relations post-Tiananmen and he “basked in the glory of being received as China’s top 
leader in the world’s most powerful country.”96 He emerged from the trip with “his
07personal stature and his diplomatic role...enhanced.” While Clinton was not overly 
impressed with the 1997 summit, he did make his first presidential visit to China the 
following year in 1998. Soon after Jiang’s and Clinton’s official visits in 1997 and 1998,
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in April 1999 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji made a trip to Washington D.C. where he 
pressed the issue of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and what 
Chinese officials saw as the U. S.’ role in delaying that process. Despite such 
disagreements, the very ability of Chinese leaders to travel to the U.S. and American 
leaders to travel to China showed that Jiang had overseen the restoration of relations 
between China and the U.S. after the tensions following Tiananmen.
Despite Jiang’s attempts to improve relations with the U.S., Chinese officials were 
still quite fearful that the U.S. would use its critiques of China’s human rights record as 
justification to intervene in what Chinese officials viewed as China’s internal affairs. As 
noted above, the first Gulf War and other Western interventions throughout the 1990s 
added to these fears. As a result during Jiang’s time as leader of the PRC, Chinese 
officials routinely spoke of their opposition to a uni-polar international system, a thinly 
veiled critique of the post Cold War system during the 1990s and early 2000s in which 
the U.S. was the world’s sole superpower. Jiang, himself, often emphasized the 
“‘building multipolar world’ (duoji shijie) concept” which was intended “to multipolarize
QO
or counterbalance the U.S.-centric international system.” In many ways this was 
similar to Deng’s earlier opposition to hegemony and the role of superpowers during the 
Cold War. However, while China had previously opposed the superpower status of both 
the Soviet Union and the U.S., Chinese officials now feared that without the Soviet 
Union to counterbalance the U.S., America would increase its efforts to democratize and 
liberalize countries like China.
Partly as a result of Chinese officials’ fear of a uni-polar international system,
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during Jiang’s time as the leader of the PRC, China showed an increased willingness to 
enter into multilateral and international institutions as a means for conducting foreign 
policy. While Chinese officials had previously viewed multilateral institutions with 
suspicion, worrying that they would undermine China's sovereignty, in the 1990s Chinese 
officials began to realize that they could use these organizations to actually protect 
China’s sovereignty and to counterbalance the U.S.’ power. Building on Deng’s “opening 
up” policy, Chinese officials began to see how participation in multilateral institutions 
like the WTO could foster China’s economic growth and development. Given Chinese 
officials’ previous beliefs that most multilateral institutions and international agreements 
were threats to China’s sovereignty, many Western observers were surprised by China’s 
agreement to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and by the concessions 
China made in 1999 as part of its bid to join the WTO." In November 2001, China was 
finally granted admission to the WTO after more than 15 years of negotiation. During 
Jiang’s time in power China also agreed to work with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan in an organization known as the “Group of Five” or the “Shanghai Five,” 
which would later become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 with the 
addition of Uzbekistan, to settle boundary disputes and work together on other issues.100 
Under Jiang, China also became more involved in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and in negotiations over North Korea's nuclear 
program.101 There was not, however, multilateral agreement on all issues, as
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disagreements persisted over disputed territories in the South China Sea.102
While the primary focus of China’s foreign policy under Jiang was major power 
diplomacy, with a particular focus on improving relations with the U.S., China also began 
to re-engage developing countries under Jiang. Jianwei Wang noted while Jiang “was 
particularly enthusiastic about establishing ‘strategic partnerships’ with major powers 
such as the United States, Russia, France, and UK,” it was under Jiang that China began 
to expand its outreach to its neighbors and to developing countries around the world. The 
efforts put in place under Jiang to re-build relationships with African and Latin American 
countries, which China had largely ignored since Mao’s policies of supporting 
revolutionary movements in these countries, laid the groundwork for the greater 
expansion of China’s outreach to developing countries under Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao. 
Jiang visited at least ten Latin American countries between 1993 and 2001, as part of 
efforts to improve ties.103 In 1996 Jiang visited Africa to “forge a China-African 
relationship of ‘all-out cooperation and long-term stability towards the 21st century.’” 104 
In 2000, Jiang also launched the “going out” strategy in which the CPC encouraged and 
helped Chinese firms to invest overseas. This policy not only helped Chinese companies 
start competing in foreign markets, but it also helped to spread Chinese influence abroad 
and to promote China’s larger economic interests.105 China’s renewed engagement with 
developing countries was not just limited to Africa and Latin America, but included 
attempts to promote a more favorable image among its neighbors. For example, China’s
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offer of economic assistance to neighboring countries during the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis was an important turning point in China’s formulation of a more active foreign 
policy, as “for the first time in decades China had taken a stance on a major international 
issue,” rather than simply lying low as Deng had previously recommended, “and had 
banked credit as a benign force in global affairs.”106
106 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 36.
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6. Generational Shifts in Chinese Leadership: 1990s-2000s
While a changing international system and an increasingly interconnected global 
economy obviously played a large role in encouraging Chinese officials to pursue a more 
active and eventually a more aggressive foreign policy, generational shifts within China 
and Chinese leadership during the 1990s and 2000s were also a significant factor. Cheng 
Li, an expert on the transformation of political leaders and generational change in China, 
has argued that “the Chinese political process, including the making of foreign policy,” is 
“highly personalized” and therefore changes in leadership or generations of leaders has a 
profound impact upon Chinese foreign policy.107 While causation is always difficult to 
determine, the shift from the second to the third and from the third to the fourth, 
generations of Chinese leadership undoubtedly played a significant role in China’s 
transition to a more active foreign policy. According to Cheng Li, the history of the PRC 
“indicates that changes in the composition of the political elite often reflect—and 
sometimes herald—broad social, economic and political changes in the country at 
large.”108 This is true in terms of Chinese officials’ views on foreign policy as well. As 
Kurlantzick highlights, “until the mid-1990s, the generation that had grown up around 
Mao—including Deng Xiaoping himself—still dominated China's inner circle”109 
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, members of the second generation began to either 
pass away or were forced to retire.110 This opened the door for the third generation of 
Chinese leadership to assume more prominent roles. The resulting turnover in Chinese
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leadership positions was dramatic and rapid. A study of Chinese leaders in 2001 found 
that
of the twenty-four officials who became full or alternate members of the 
Politburo at the Fifteenth National Congress in September 1997, only six had 
served in the Party leadership before 1992, and most were at least ten years 
younger than the men they’d replaced.111
Cheng Li defines the third generation of PRC leadership as CPC officials who started
their careers during “the socialist transformation of the 1950s” while the fourth
generation of leaders “had their formative years during the Cultural Revolution” between
roughly 1966 and 1976.112 As members of both the third and fourth generations began to
assume leadership roles, Chinese attitudes towards foreign policy began to shift. While
most members of the third and fourth generations had experienced the trauma of the
Cultural Revolution like their predecessors, they had also seen how far China had come
since Deng first began reforms in 1979. Moreover, as Kurlantzick notes, “many of these
new leaders hailed from China’s urbane eastern provinces, which had benefited the most
from economic reforms and which were most open to external influence,” possibly
making these new Chinese officials more likely to advocate for continuing economic
reforms and greater engagement with the rest of the world.113 The younger generations of
Chinese leadership had witnessed the enormous strides that China had made since Deng’s
reforms and had more exposure to the outside world than their predecessors. They
therefore were also increasingly confident and, like much of the younger Chinese
populace, believed that China could begin to take a larger, more proactive, role in the
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international system to secure China’s interests. Another key difference between the first 
and second generations and the third and fourth generations of Chinese leadership was 
their backgrounds and education. The first and second generations of Chinese leadership 
were dominated by “revolutionary ideologues” with personal military experience in the 
Communist revolution. In contrast, the third and fourth generations were made almost 
entirely of CPC members who were trained as engineers or what Cheng Li labeled 
“technocrats” or “the technocrat-manager.”114 Technocrats approached governance, 
including foreign policy, from a more pragmatic and scientific perspective than their 
revolutionary predecessors, what Cheng Li labeled as “technocratic thinking.”115 While 
revolutionaries like Deng dominated the CPC as late as the 1990s, by 2001, Cheng Li 
was able to observe “today’s China is largely run by technocrats, engineers turned 
politicians.”116 The shift from revolutionaries to technocratic engineers in the CPC was 
“not only the largest peaceful elite turnover in Chinese history, but.. .probably the most
117massive, rapid change of elites within any regime in human history.” From 1949 to 
roughly the 1980s, Chinese officials advanced in the CPC based on their “seniority in
joining the Party and the revolution,” “ideological commitment,” “political loyalty and
118activism in the class struggle,” and “class background from a ‘proletarian family.’”
After Deng became the leader of the CPC, however, he “constantly argued that 
intellectuals, as a social stratum, should not be treated as an ‘alien force’ (yiji), as had 
happened during the Mao era, but should be respected as the ‘core (gugari) of the
114 Cheng Li, China's Leaders: The New Generation, 26 and 80.
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modernization program.’”119 This focus on expertise in Chinese officials was continued 
through the third and fourth generations. As Cheng Li, noted, the head of the fourth 
generation of leadership, Hu Jintao, while CPC General Secretary, argued that “the Party 
should oppose the tendency to divorce its own leadership from expertise and should no 
longer oppose experts. Instead, he said, the Party should establish the concept that all 
leaders must be trained specialists.”120 There was even a proposal that all Chinese 
officials must have at least an MA or a PhD.121
Indeed, the third and fourth generations of Chinese leaders (including those in
1 99mid-level positions) were generally better educated than their predecessors. While 
only 20 percent of China’s provincial leaders in 1982 had attended college, by 2002 98 
percent of them had college degrees.123 Moreover, two-thirds of fourth generation 
officials bom after 1953 held postgraduate degrees.124 In his detailed study on the third 
and fourth generations of leaders, Cheng Li observed that more leaders in the fourth 
generation attended graduate school than even their predecessors in the third generation 
who generally only had undergraduate degrees or attended two-year colleges or 
polytechnics. The number of leaders trained in economics and finance also rose sharply. 
In 2001, Cheng Li calculated that three times as many CPC leaders were trained in 
economics, management, finance, accounting, and statistics, than were in the Fourteenth 
Central Committee of the CPC which was in session from 1992 to 1997.125 Further, 
while in the 1990s most of the important financial posts in China were held by third
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generation leaders who were trained as engineers, by the 2000s, these posts were 
increasingly held by younger CPC officials with actual financial or economic 
education.126 Officials who had a background in finance rather than engineering were 
more likely to understand the global economy and how China’s own economy depended 
on access to overseas markets and foreign sources of raw materials and energy. Some 
members of the fourth generation studied in Western countries, in contrast to those in the 
third generation, who were predominantly trained in the Soviet Union or other Eastern 
European countries.127 No leaders from the fourth generation studied in the Soviet Union
1 98or Eastern Europe because of the decline of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s. Rather,
many fourth generation Chinese officials studied at elite schools inside China such as 
Qinghua University.129 China did not begin sending large numbers of students abroad 
until after Deng’s reforms in the late 1970s. However, following Deng’s reforms, China 
sent thousands of students to the U.S., so their full impact has likely not yet been fully 
felt.130
The increasing education standards among Chinese leaders meant that Chinese 
officials were increasingly more knowledgeable about world events and willing to engage 
in discussions on foreign policy. As one example of the change in Chinese officials’ 
understanding and conduct of foreign policy, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State Susan Shirk stated that even as late as 1993 it was “easier to persuade the North 
Koreans to come [to an informal diplomatic meeting] than it was the Chinese, since the
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Chinese were so isolated and distrustful.” By the mid-2000s, in contrast, some U.S. 
diplomats “marveled” at Chinese diplomats’ knowledge of internal American political 
debates such as the American neo-conservative movement of the early 2000s.132 Younger 
Chinese officials who had visited or studied in the West also learned how think tanks, 
academics, and public opinion polls influenced the creation of Western policies, including 
foreign policy. While most Chinese officials still did not advocate a multi-party system 
or drastic liberal political reforms within China, they nonetheless were more willing to 
take part in internal CPC debates on foreign policy issues, to hear from Chinese scholars, 
and, to a degree, even the Chinese public. During the 1990s and 2000s Chinese leaders 
increasingly supported Chinese think tanks, and the Chinese foreign ministry created an 
internal agency focused on long-term planning.133 Third and fourth generations of 
Chinese leadership were also far more open about their views and policies than previous 
generations, partially because, unlike the earlier strongmen Mao and Deng who 
dominated almost every aspect of PRC rule, leaders from the subsequent generations 
were “not able to [completely] control the mass media or the intellectual community.”134 
Despite their differences in education, one area where the second, third, and 
fourth generations of Chinese leadership were largely similar was their emphasis on the 
importance of stability inside China. Several scholars have commented on the traumatic 
impact that the Cultural Revolution had both on Chinese society and multiple generations 
of Chinese leadership.135 As a result of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese 
leaders throughout the third, fourth, and fifth generations, along with a majority of the
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Chinese public, placed a very high value on stability, as reflected in opinion polls 
conducted during the early-to-mid 2000s.136 Fourth generation Chinese leaders were both 
“more aware of the need for political reform than their predecessors” but also mindful of
1 37the need to “‘manage’ political reform in a controlled way.”
In general, Chinese officials who experienced the Cultural Revolution during their 
formative years were “politically sophisticated but ideologically disillusioned,” “their 
idealism was shattered, their energy wasted, their education lost, and their careers 
interrupted.”138 As a result, the third and fourth generations of Chinese leadership were 
less ideological and more pragmatic than their predecessors and more likely to 
independently evaluate policies based on their effects on China’s national interests,
■I '>Q
allowing them to reconsider and reformulate China’s foreign policy. Strict adherence 
to communist ideology mattered far less to the newer generation of Chinese leaders when 
making policy decisions than it had to past generations. Foreign partners were no longer 
deemed off-limits by ideological concerns, and Chinese leaders could now deal with a 
variety of states for pragmatic ends.140 To emphasize how much Chinese foreign policy 
had shifted away from ideology by the 1990s and 2000s when compared to the Mao era, 
in the early 2000s, China actually mediated between the Philippine government and 
communist insurgents ultimately leading the insurgents to threaten Chinese investors in 
the Philippines. Similarly, the PRC supported the Nepalese monarchy against a Maoist 
rebel group.141 Notwithstanding their supposed ideological similarity, China sided
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against the communist/Maoist forces in both cases because Chinese officials assessed that 
supporting the existing governments in these countries was in China’s economic interest.
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7. Waning Faith in Communism, Increasing Chinese Nationalism, Shifts in Youth 
Attitudes, and Growing Chinese Confidence
With rapid economic growth in China also came a corresponding sense of pride 
among many Chinese people. Kurlantzick has argued that “in the years after Tiananmen, 
both the Chinese public and the Chinese leadership gained vital confidence—confidence 
that China had a right to become a global power.”142 China after all had experienced 
stunning economic growth since Deng Xiaoping began enacting reforms in the late 
1970s. Between 1979 and the late 2000s, China, it has been argued, raised 200 million of 
its people out of poverty, perhaps more than any other society in such a short period of 
time.143 From 1979 to 2007, China’s trade with other nations grew eight times faster than 
overall world trade, allowing China to build trade surpluses of more than $100 billion 
annually. It amassed the largest currency reserves in the world, and “became Asia’s 
largest recipient of foreign direct investment, receiving more than $60 billion in 
investment in 2005.”144 As of 2007, China was the world’s second-largest economy 
when measured by purchasing power parity, and was on track to become the overall 
second largest economy in 2025.145
However, even as China’s economy continued to rapidly expand and Chinese 
citizens were becoming more confident in their country, Chinese officials were concerned 
that with all the market reforms and capitalistic growth, faith in the ideology of 
communism was waning. Rana Mitter, an expert on Chinese nationalism, noted in 2009
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today’s economic growth brings prosperity and comfort, but it has failed to 
bring the Chinese people values that they can believe in. And the events that 
inspired a previous generation, such as Mao’s Cultural Revolution, have been 
exposed as disasters.146
Far earlier, in the 1980s and the 1990s as the Chinese political and economic system
transitioned into more of a state-led capitalist society, Chinese officials began to realize
that Maoism and communism no longer functioned as unifying ideologies in China.147
As the Chinese leadership increasingly “urg[ed] its citizens to get rich as quickly as
possible,” Chinese officials realized that the appeal of communism was rapidly declining
and that they “needed to offer a substitute ideology to keep the population united.”148
They therefore began to increasingly foster and encourage a new form of Chinese
nationalism. As Joseph Cheng Yu-shek, an expert on Chinese foreign policy, noted, “in
the beginning of China’s economic reforms and opening to the external world, leaders
tried to use nationalism to fill the ideological void created by the crisis because of the loss
of faith in socialism.”149 In the place of communism and socialism, Chinese officials
encouraged what has been called “a kind of updated nationalism.” This new form of
Chinese nationalism emphasized China’s victimization by Western powers in the 18th and
19th century, contrasting this with China’s bright future and great economic strength.
Chinese officials also began to embrace the idea that China was a rising power and
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capitalized on popular suspicions that outside powers were trying to keep China weak.150
In 2008, journalist Steven Erlanger argued that “China’s fierce pride also covers a deeper
defensiveness, a sense that China’s rise has made it the target for the hypocritical anger of
a wounded West, especially the United States and Europe, that resents such a successful
new rival for global trade and influence.”151 This new Chinese nationalism quickly
gained popularity, arguably a new “state religion” whose god was “economic
development.”152 New children’s school textbooks stressed China’s former victimization
at the hands of foreign powers and contrasted it with China’s current growing place in the
world. Meanwhile, the PRC also played up Chinese nationalism by using large projects
1 ^like the Chinese space program to rally national support.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Chinese youth in particular began to question 
why China was not acting more forcefully to defend what they saw as China’s national 
interests. Younger Chinese did not remember the famines of the Great Leap Forward or 
“the terror” of the Cultural Revolution.154 As a result, younger Chinese during the 1990s 
and 2000s were generally less wary of a strong Chinese central government than previous 
generations and more likely to advocate for more aggressive policies. Such attitudes 
contrasted markedly with the youth and academia of the 1980s who were both far more 
politically liberal and distrustful of the Chinese central government. After Tiananmen, 
many liberal intellectuals fled the country, leaving the more conservative nationalists as 
the primary voices in China. By the 1990s, some prominent Chinese intellectuals were
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actually calling for a stronger role for the Chinese government.155 The shift in youth
attitudes shocked many older intellectuals and academics:
‘Today, my students don’t care about political science,’ complained one 
politics professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, a man who had been a 
young academic during Tiananmen. ‘They want to take business, or 
computer science, or something else that will get them a good job.... They 
think [the Chinese leadership] is too weak, and should be harder on the U.S.’
He paused, looked befuddled. ‘I don't know how to talk to them. ’156
One reason for this shift was that the economic status of many young urban Chinese in
the 1990s and 2000s was far better than it had been for youth of the 1980s. Following
Tiananmen, the CPC had made a concerted effort to effectively co-opt youth and
academics by providing them with opportunities for advancement as well as other perks
in exchange for continuing support for CPC rule. While earlier Chinese youth were told
of capitalism’s evils, many of the Chinese youth from the 1990s and 2000s had been
bombarded with the idea that they should strive to become rich. In contrast with the
youth at Tiananmen in 1989 who had been angry at their meager salaries, young Chinese
of the 1990s and 2000s had often turned away from liberal arts subjects to study business
or computer science and technology with the goals of getting high paying jobs.
The 1990s and 2000s also saw a sharp increase in the number of Chinese tourists
traveling abroad, rising from 4.5 million in 1995 to more than 30 million in 2005.158 As
more and more Chinese were allowed to travel abroad, many also came back with less
than favorable opinions of the West. Where in past years, Western countries might have
been far off, even idealized, foreign lands, with increased mobility and the prevalence of
international news coverage, many Chinese began to see the problems that existed in
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Western society. As more Chinese traveled overseas, they saw that the U.S. and Europe 
also had challenges and poverty, and thus many Chinese youth “may have lost some of 
their awe for America and Europe.”159 Chinese travelers abroad also saw that Chinese 
cities like Shanghai were increasingly as cosmopolitan as many Western cities. Suisheng 
Zhao, an expert on Chinese nationalism and politics, has termed this process the 
“demythification” of the West in China.160
At the same time, the notion of China as a rising power had begun to displace the 
old images of an isolated or weak China both inside China and in the West. The CPC 
promoted the image of an advancing and increasingly powerful China, partially as a 
means to rally national support for the CPC’s continued rule.161 Some younger Chinese 
intellectuals began to argue that the Chinese government should adopt more hardline 
policies, and increasingly questioned why China was taking what they viewed as a 
conciliatory stance on the world stage, particularly towards the U.S. In the 1990s and 
2000s younger Chinese wrote nationalistic books and participated in online chats arguing 
that the Chinese government was too soft and needed to stand up to the U.S. more. 
During this same time period, several books came out emphasizing China’s strength and 
the need for China to take its rightful place in the world. Several of these books 
advanced the idea that Western powers, particularly the U. S., were seeking to 
purposefully keep China weak. Ying Ma, an expert on “Chinese domestic attitudes,” 
noted in 2007 that “Chinese increasingly view America today as a bully who...attempts to
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thwart the rise of their country’s international influence.”162 Similarly, in 2009, John Lee, 
an expert on Chinese foreign policy, noted
Many influential thinkers in China hold lofty, impatient ambitions for their 
country. Several months ago, for instance, a group of state-sponsored Chinese 
scholars released a bestselling book titled Unhappy China: The Great Time,
Grand Vision, and Our Challenges. It argued that, given China’s growth, it 
should put pmdence aside, break away from Western influence, and come to 
recognize that it has the power to lead in Asia.163
During the late 1990s and 2000s there was an active debate within Chinese society about 
the kinds of changes China should make to its foreign policy. As Chinese foreign policy 
expert William A. Callahan noted in 2010, “there is growing debate inside the People’s 
Republic of China about the country’s proper strategic goals. Many intellectuals and 
policy-makers are asking how China can convert its new economic power into enduring 
political and cultural influence around the globe.”164 The sides in this debate could 
roughly be divided “into those who argue[d for] the need for China to pursue its interests 
more assertively and unilaterally and those who argue[d] a rising China’s interests [were] 
best served through further steady and peaceful integration within the international 
system.”165 As Bergsten and his co-authors noted, “those who advocate[d] a more 
assertive, ‘nationalist’ approach believe[d] China must more consciously marshal its 
growing resources to realize the country’s interests, which for too long have been 
suppressed by foreign forces intent on keeping China down.”166 This new more 
aggressive nationalism fed upon the deeply ingrained fear of control by outside powers,
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which had been a part of the Chinese consciousness since the Opium Wars and the
“Century of Humiliation”:
this viewpoint ha[d] a deep history in Chinese thinking—drawing strength 
from the view that from the mid- 19th to mid^O* century, China was 
devastatingly humiliated at the hands of foreign powers—but in recent years 
has seen resurgence as China's development and popular confidence levels 
have steeply risen.167
As noted above, Deng and other members of the second generation of Chinese leadership 
had also been affected by the memory of the “Century of Humiliation” and the fear of 
control by outside powers. However, Deng had argued that China should avoid 
becoming involved in most foreign policy issues in order to avoid such a subservient 
relationship in the future. Now younger Chinese were arguing the opposite, that China 
should act more forcefully in the international arena in order to protect China’s interests. 
The fear of outside influence was a strong current throughout Chinese society, and even 
today Chinese commemorate “National Humiliation Day” every year on September 18 as 
a reminder of the “Century of Humiliation.” Ramo noted in 2004 that “Chinese 
strategists and officials will often tell you in conversation that the heart of all Chinese
strategic thinking, and even Chinese development goals, is rooted in the humiliation of
168the Opium Wars, when China found itself helpless in front of British battleships.” 
Regardless of how CPC officials felt China should proceed with its new foreign policy, 
many Chinese scholars and leaders began to refer to China as a “daguo” or a great power 
and suggested that China should “adopt the mentality of a daguo”169
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8. Emergence of the “China Threat” Theory
Chinese citizens and officials were not the only ones to debate China’s rise and 
the potential foreign policy strategies it might pursue. Western officials and scholars had 
been nervously watching as China grew in both economic and military strength, with the 
harsh crackdown at Tiananmen Square and the Cold War fresh in their minds. During the 
1990s and the 2000s many Western officials and scholars began to debate what became 
known as the “China threat” theory. This theory argued that as China continued to grow 
in economic power it would gain confidence, seek to expand its military, and eventually 
become more aggressive, potentially leading to armed struggle. Scholars pointed to the 
previous examples of Japan and Germany during the early to mid 20th century, noting that 
both countries, like China, rapidly went from relatively poor nations, to economic 
powerhouses. Japan and Germany, however, then went on in the mid 20 century to 
become aggressive and militaristic societies which invaded their neighbors. Western 
scholars actively debated how to deal with a rising China, and how the potential “China 
threat” could be contained.
Whether the “China threat” theory was an accurate assessment by Western 
observers is difficult to assess. Even today, foreign policy scholars are still actively 
debating whether China’s increasing power and more active and, at times, aggressive 
foreign policy poses a threat to Western interests and the international system. It is clear, 
however, that at least some Chinese officials have become far more comfortable than 
their predecessors in aggressively pursuing what they see as China’s interests, even when 
their words or actions cause conflict with other countries. One recent example of China’s
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increased willingness to act more aggressively is the November 23, 2013 declaration by 
Chinese officials of an “Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. 
This new Chinese ADIZ included airspace over and around islands disputed by Japan and 
China, which are believed to be located in an area of seabed rich in oil, natural gas, and 
other natural resources. The new Chinese ADIZ also included airspace previously 
claimed by South Korea and Taiwan.170
China’s declaration of this new ADIZ was met with condemnation from the U.S., 
Japan, and South Korea. The Washington Times quoted U.S. White House officials as 
saying the declaration was “unacceptable” and Reuters described White House 
spokesman Jay Carney as saying it was a “‘dangerous and provocative’ move that 
increased the risk of stumbling into a crisis and .. .was not consistent with the behavior of
171a major power.” Deputy White House spokesman Josh Earnest said that China’s 
creation of the ADIZ was “unnecessarily inflammatory and has a destabilizing impact on 
the region,” and U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki accused Chinese officials 
of trying to “unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea.”172 U.S. Defense 
Secretary Chuck Hagel meanwhile warned that China’s “unilateral action.. .increases the 
risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations” and the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Martin Dempsey indicated that U.S. officials were making it clear to 
China that “territorial disputes should not be resolved ‘unilaterally and through
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coercion.’” 173
Three days after China announced the creation of the ADIZ, on November 26, 
2013, the U.S. flew two U.S. B-52 bombers over the islands contested between Japan and 
China without alerting Chinese officials (as the Chinese had announced would now be 
required). The move was intended as a show of force by the U.S., support for the U.S.’ 
ally Japan, and a sign that the U.S. did not accept China’s unilateral declaration of the 
ADIZ.174 The flight of the bombers was also meant to discourage China from unilaterally 
declaring additional ADIZs in other areas such as the South China Sea, where China is
1 7^also attempting to exert its control over contested islands. In the days following 
China’s declaration of the ADIZ, military aircraft from Japan and South Korea also
1 n(\purposefully transited this airspace without informing Chinese officials. On December 
08, 2013, in response to the Chinese ADIZ declaration, South Korea announced it was 
expanding the airspace it claimed to encompass islands disputed between South Korea 
and Japan and airspace overlapping with parts of the new Chinese ADIZ and previously 
declared Japanese airspace.177
Tensions in the region remained high as Chinese officials warned that China 
“would take unspecified ‘emergency defensive measures’ if aircraft did not comply” with
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the new ADIZ requirements.178 On November 29,2013, China sent fighter jets to
“investigate” U.S. and Japanese planes that were traveling through the ADIZ.179 Even if
Chinese officials later attempt to moderate their stance, the public announcement of the
ADIZ will lead more nationalistic Chinese factions to pressure Chinese officials to
enforce the airspace claims. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Asia-Pacific director at the US
Institute of Peace, commented on the internal pressures within China that the
announcement of the ADIZ had created, saying
the danger in the announcement is that it empowers the People’s Liberation 
Army, maritime agencies and netizens [internet users] to hold the government 
to account.. ..Now people are transgressing the zone, they have to make it 
look to the domestic audience like they are serious. They have given birth to 
internal pressures.180
The New York Times wrote that China’s move also put U.S. President Barack Obama in a 
“delicate position.. .drawn into a geopolitical dispute that will test how far he is willing to 
go to contain China’s rising regional ambitions.”181 Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State James Steinberg and foreign policy expert Michael E. O’Hanlon wrote that China’s 
declaration of the ADIZ had “unleashed a storm of concern among China’s neighbors” 
and U.S. officials.182 Steinberg and O’Hanlon further argued that “China’s action reflects 
the deeper challenge now posed by its growing military capability and international 
activism,” perhaps granting credence to the “China threat” theory.183 They also argued 
that “the unilateral and assertive nature of the new Chinese effort increases the risk of
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Disputed Air Zone,” The Guardian, November 29,2013,
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conflict” and highlighted how China did not consult with other countries before 
establishing the ADIZ, did not explain how China planned to implement and enforce the 
ADIZ, and did not clarify whether the ADIZ was a precursor to territorial claims of the 
islands which fell within it.184 Steinberg and O’Hanlon argued, therefore that “by failing 
to provide reassurance, China has given other nations justification to draw less benign
conclusions” for example leading to South Korea expanding its own ADIZ in response to
1 8^China’s actions. Steinberg and O’Hanlon further noted that other countries in the 
region could easily view China’s actions “as the latest chapter in Beijing’s attempt to 
unilaterally alter the status quo in connection with its local territorial disputes” and 
argued that “in doing so, China has prompted its neighbors to respond in ways that
1RAheighten the risk of conflict, such as instructing civilian aircraft not to comply.”
Steinberg and O’Hanlon concluded their article by stating that due to “growing tensions 
from China’s ascendance in international power and stature,” the international 
community was “likely to confront many more crises like this — or worse — in the years 
and decades ahead.” 187 Peter Dutton, the director of the China Maritime Studies Institute 
at the United States Naval War College, went even further when commenting on the new 
Chinese ADIZ arguing that “it is clear that the Chinese do not seek regional stability on 
any level.. .They intend to be disruptive in order to remake the Asian regional system in 
accordance with their preferences.”188
It is hard to image China under Deng making such a declaration as the new ADIZ, 
in effect openly challenging the U.S. and its allies in East Asia. Some scholars therefore
184 Steinberg and O'Hanlon.
185 Steinberg and O'Hanlon. Peralta.
186 Steinberg and O'Hanlon.
187 Steinberg and O'Hanlon.
188 Baker and Perlez.
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will point to these and other actions like them, as evidence that the “China threat” is real 
and that China has become far more aggressive in the past 20 years. Chinese officials 
and other scholars, however, will likely argue that other nations have ADIZs and that 
China is only acting to protect its interests in the same way other nations do and that this 
is a normal transition for a rising power. Still, yet others may argue that this either was 
the action of an aggressive minority within China or was an action meant to appease an 
aggressive minority in China. Either way, it is clear that China’s rise has not been 
without conflict and at times difficult adjustments for other nations. While large-scale 
armed conflict has not broken out between China and other nations, China’s rise in power 
has been at the very least somewhat destabilizing to the status quo in international 
relations. Whether this transforms into an outright threat to the West and to China’s 
neighbors remains to be seen. Arguments can, and have been, made both that China’s 
rise has been good for the region and the world overall through the benefits that have 
accompanied its economic growth, and conversely that China’s rise has created 
uncertainty and turmoil for other countries, particularly those in East Asia. Both 
assessments are probably true to certain degrees.
While it is unclear whether the “China threat” theory will ultimately turn out to be 
justified, it is clear that Chinese officials were (and still are) actively concerned by the 
theory and how to best to effectively respond it. By simply raising this theory, Western 
scholars undoubtedly forced some Chinese officials to moderate their actions, for fear 
that if they acted too aggressively, the “China threat” theory would gain credence and 
Western powers would work to constrain China. As detailed further below, countering 
the “China threat” theory became a major priority for Chinese officials during the 1990s
68
and 2000s. If nothing else, the emergence of the “China threat” theory forced Chinese 
officials to become more aware of how their actions were being perceived abroad, and of 
the concerns other nations had regarding China’s rise.
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9.1999-2001: International Events Spark New Debate on Chinese Foreign Policy
Around the turn of the century, two international events involving China and the 
U.S. sparked a broad discussion among Chinese officials and intellectuals about China’s 
place in the world and China-U.S. relations. In May 1999, U.S. and NATO forces 
accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as part of operations against the 
former Yugoslavia in the conflict over Kosovo, killing three Chinese journalists. 
Following the bombing there were massive student protests in Beijing where thousands 
of Chinese denounced the U.S., surrounded the American embassy, threw stones and 
bottles, and trapped the U.S. ambassador to China inside for four days. Many Chinese 
also boycotted American products, and some even called for a Chinese military response 
against the U.S.189 Western officials were surprised by the ferocity of the demonstrations, 
and the stark contrast between these protests and the pro-American sentiments that had 
been expressed during the Tiananmen demonstrations just a decade earlier.190 Xiaoming 
Huang, an expert on East Asian politics, commented that many Chinese believed that the 
bombing was a “symbol of a perceived hidden agenda in how the U.S. was handling 
relations with China,” and was part of a U.S. plot to keep China from becoming more 
powerful in the world.191 Jiang Zemin made a point of expressing strong public protest 
over the bombing, but he and most of the Chinese leadership also did not want to 
endanger the still crucial and relatively newly repaired relationship with the U.S.
Chinese officials therefore pursued a dual path of allowing mass demonstrations against
189 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 26-27.
190 Li Cheng, “China in 1999: Seeking Common Ground at a Time of Tension and Conflict,” Asian Survey, 
Vol. 40, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1999 (Jan. - Feb., 2000): 113.
191 Xiaoming Huang, “Managing Fluctuations in U.S.-China Relations: World Politics, National Priorities, 
and Policy Leadership,” Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2000): 274.
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the U.S. while at the same time working to keep the fundamental aspects of the bilateral 
relationship alive.
Although U.S.-China relations were able to recover from the Belgrade bombing, 
the U.S.-China relationship was soon tested again. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese fighter jet 
collided with a U.S. reconnaissance plane, causing the death of one Chinese pilot. The 
U.S. plane was forced to land on a small Chinese island (Hainan) and a brief diplomatic 
standoff ensued over the fate of the American crew and the plane itself. The cause of the 
collision was disputed. The U.S. claimed the incident had taken place in international 
airspace and that the Chinese pilot had been acting aggressively, while the Chinese 
claimed the U.S. plane had entered Chinese airspace. Ten days after the incident, China 
released the 24 man crew after the U.S. sent a “two sorries” letter apologizing for the 
death of the Chinese pilot and for entering Chinese airspace and landing on the island.
The U.S. plane itself was not released by the Chinese until July. As a result of the 
incident and the ensuing standoff, the Pentagon initiated “a case-by-case review of all
1 O '?  «military-to-military contacts with China and drastically reduced such contacts.” While 
the collision and standoff proved to be an extremely tense time in U.S.-China relations, 
officials on both sides remained relatively calm. Neither party seemed to want to risk 
disturbing the underlying currents of the overall bilateral relationship. Despite the desire 
of Chinese leadership to move past the Hainan Island incident (also known as the EP-3 
incident), for many Chinese nationalists and youth it served as yet another example that 
the U.S. was seeking to prevent China from becoming more powerful and a sign that the 
U.S. was no longer the beacon of liberty it had represented to young Chinese during
192 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The United States and Asia in 2001: Changing Agendas,” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, 
No. 1, A Survey o f Asia in 2001 (Jan. - Feb., 2002): 6.
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Tiananmen but was now a “potential enemy.” Both of these international incidents 
caused many Chinese to re-examine Deng’s previous guidance that China should “lay 
low,” and led them to ask whether China needed to adopt “a more aggressive foreign 
policy” to defend its interests.193 At the same time, advances in information technology 
in China, such as the proliferation of television and the internet, brought international 
news to many Chinese who had never had access to it before, and stoked broader interest 
in international affairs.
193 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 27-28.
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10. China’s Growing Need for Natural Resources Pushes Expansion of Foreign 
Relations
China's growing need for energy and raw materials was also a major factor 
driving China’s transition to a more active foreign policy. As China’s economy 
continued to expand during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, Chinese industries required 
more energy and raw materials, many of which could not be found in large enough 
quantities inside China. Between 1978 and 2000 China's demand for energy grew by 
roughly four percent each year and between 1980 and 2002, China’s demand for oil grew 
on average roughly six percent per year.194 In 2003, Chinese demand for oil rose nine 
percent, and in 2004 it rose another 17 percent.195 In 1985 Chinese demand for oil was 
1,842.4 kilobarrels a day; by 1995 it had risen to 3,289.8 kilobarrels a day. Between 
1995 and 2005, Chinese demand for oil more than doubled to 6,730.2 kilobarrels a day.196 
Similarly between 2000 and 2009, China’s demand for oil almost doubled from roughly 
4,600 kilobarrels a day in 2000 to over 8,000 kilobarrels a day in 2009.197 Chinese 
domestic energy production could not keep up with this growing demand. According to 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, China 
actually remained a net oil exporter. However, despite steadily rising domestic oil 
production, with the Chinese economy continuing to develop so rapidly and requiring 
more and more energy, by 1993 China had become a net oil importer, and by 1996 China
194 Bergsten etal., 137 and 151.
195 Bergsten et al., 151.
196 “2012 Report on the People’s Republic of China; Oil and Gas Security,” International Energy Agency,
2 .
197 “2012 Report on the People’s Republic of China; Oil and Gas Security,” International Energy Agency, 
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was also a net crude oil importer.198 Between 1995 and 2005 the amount of oil China 
was importing had increased more than 10 fold from 280.6 kilobarrels a day to 3093.3 
kilobarrels a day. By 2009, Chinese oil imports had grown by over 37 percent, compared 
to 2005, to 4245.7 kilobarrels a day.199 In 1995 China was importing 8.5 percent of the 
oil it consumed. By 2000, this amount had more than tripled to 29.3 percent of China’s 
oil consumption; by 2005 it had risen even further to 46 percent and by 2009, China was 
importing over half the oil it consumed (52.8 percent).200 Between 2002 and 2006, China
<^ A1
accounted for 26 percent of the growth in global oil demand. By 2008, China had 
become the world’s second largest oil importer.202 While heavy industry was the primary 
driver of China’s growing energy needs, as of 2008 there were also 1,100 new cars on the 
streets of Beijing every day, further contributing to China’s surging demand for oil.203
Between 2001 and 2006, electricity consumption also doubled in China as new 
industries opened across the country.204 Between 2004 and 2008 China increased its 
power generation capacity by 70 percent and in 2006 and 2007 China added 200 
gigawatts of new power generation capacity to its system, more than the entire capacity 
of Germany and Italy combined.205 While China had previously been able to rely on 
domestic sources of coal for much of its electricity generation, due to issues with internal 
production, congested railways, a fragmented electrical system, and soaring demand,
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China was forced to import more coal.206 China's demand for coal increased by 66 
percent between 2000 and 2005, and as of 2005, China consumed more than 2 billion 
tons of coal, almost twice the level of consumption of the U.S. at that time.207 In 2012, 
despite being the world’s largest producer of coal at 3,549 million tons, China was 
actually a net importer of coal, in fact the world's largest importer of coal, importing 278 
million tons a year.208 Similarly, according to the IEA, China’s demand for natural gas 
increased by over 500 percent between 2000 and 2011 “from 24.5 bcm (67 mcm/d) in 
2000 to around 130 bcm (356 mcm/d) in 2011 .”209 Despite greatly increasing their 
internal natural gas production capacity, by 2007 China had also become a net importer 
of natural gas.210 By 2009 China was the world’s second largest energy consumer and 
was a net importer of oil, coal, and natural gas.211 Similarly, by the 2000s China had also 
become one of the world’s biggest consumers of copper, iron ore, aluminum, platinum, 
and timber.212
As noted by Kurlantzick and Erica Downs, an energy analyst at the Brookings 
Institution, China did not have a sizeable strategic oil reserve like the U.S., and as of 
2007, China’s domestic oil and gas production was declining and the amount of oil, coal, 
and natural gas China needed to import continued to rise.213 Energy security, therefore, 
became an increasingly important issue for Chinese policy makers throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s. Ensuring there was a stable international environment, according to Deng’s
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guidance, would help China to be able to obtain more of these resources from abroad.
However, mindful of continuing tensions with the U.S. and remembering the isolation
China experienced following Tiananmen, Chinese officials were concerned that if a new
conflict broke out between the U.S. and China, the U.S. might attempt to prevent China
from obtaining the resources its economy needed.214 Chinese officials increasingly
believed that they could not
trust the world markets for long-term supplies of oil, gas, minerals, and other 
commodities, since the United States control[ed] the global sea lanes and 
ha[d] long-standing relationships with key oil suppliers like Saudi Arabia.215
Chinese leaders therefore began a conscious effort to form better relations with countries 
rich in natural resources and to encourage Chinese energy firms to invest abroad in order 
to secure access to foreign supplies of energy. While under Deng, China had been 
hesitant to act on the world stage, by the time the fourth generation of Chinese leadership 
came to power, China had
cast off that reticence. Starved of natural resources to power its turbocharged 
economy, China desperately need[ed] oil, gas, metals and other commodities, 
and China’s large, state-linked natural resources firms.. .prospect[ed] for01/
deals across the globe.
In the 1990s and 2000s Chinese companies, encouraged by the Chinese government, 
went on a “frantic shopping spree” purchasing the rights to, or investing in, energy fields 
and companies in Venezuela, Peru, Sudan, Nigeria, Iran, Kazakhstan, Burma, and several 
other countries.217 China’s efforts to diversify its foreign sources of oil were already
214 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 41.
215 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 41.
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showing results by the early to mid 2000s. For example, in 1995 China obtained more 
than half its crude oil from Indonesia and Oman. By 2003, China had greatly diversified 
its foreign sources of oil, importing 16.8 percent of its oil from Saudi Arabia, 13.8 
percent from Iran, and 10.3 percent from Oman.218 As of 2007, about 14 percent of the 
oil imported by China came from Iran.219 By 2009 the Middle East provided about half 
of China’s oil imports and Africa provided about one-third 220 Similarly, according to the 
IEA, in 2011, over 50 percent of the 5,000+ kilobarrels a day of crude oil China imported 
came from Middle Eastern countries and roughly 24 percent came from African 
countries.221 By 2011,20 percent of the crude oil China imported came from Saudi 
Arabia, 12 percent from Angola, 11 percent from Iran, 7 percent from Oman, 7 percent
9 99from Russia, 5 percent from Sudan, and 5 percent from Iraq.” By the late 2000s Chma 
had become one of the largest investors in Angola’s oil industry and was possibly lending 
more money to Africa than the World Bank, largely to “facilitate” access to oil and 
natural gas.223 Similarly, by the late 2000s, much of Australia’s economy, which was 
based on mineral extraction, had become almost entirely dependent on selling minerals to
224China given the Chinese economy’s voracious appetite for such natural resources.
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11. Hu Jintao: Peaceful Development, New Frontier Diplomacy, the Beijing 
Consensus, Harmonious World, and a Burgeoning Superpower
The 2000s brought about the official shift from the third generation of Chinese
leadership under Jiang Zemin, to the fourth generation of leadership under Hu Jintao. In
May 2002, Hu, who it was already apparent would succeed Jiang, made a visit to
Washington, D.C. and later in November that same year Jiang stepped down from the
Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China and Hu became the
party’s General Secretary. In 2003, Hu Jintao officially became president of the PRC
after Jiang resigned from that position. In 2004, Jiang resigned his last major position,
the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Hu assumed the
chairmanship of the CMC.
As noted above, Hu came to power just as a new generation of Chinese officials
and the Chinese populace were ready for China to begin taking a larger role on the world
stage. As Ramo noted in 2004,
Chinese strategists now feel some kind of strategic leverage is a must for 
their continued development. Unlike Deng-era foreign policy, which was 
guided by the idea that China should ‘hide its brightness’, Hu-era policy is 
already defined by an awareness of China’s place in the world.225
Chinese officials had crafted a new foreign policy strategy for a newly powerful China,
which Kurlantzick termed the “charm offensive.”226 The strategy was both a recognition
of China’s growing power and a reaction to the growing prevalence of the “China threat”
theory. As part of this strategy, China would portray itself as a benign power and a friend
to all nations, with the goal of convincing other nations that they had nothing to fear from
225 Ramo, 38-39.
226 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 36.
78
China, and that what was good for China was good for the rest of the world. Chinese
officials openly discussed how their new polices were designed to counter the ideas put
forward by the “China threat” theory. Former Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen
reportedly stated in an interview in the early 2000s “that in ten years’ time, when China is
more developed, there will be no market for this [‘China threat’] theory.”227 In order to
help allay fears that China might cause the kinds of disruptions and conflicts that had
accompanied the rise of earlier powers like Germany and Japan, Chinese scholars and
officials developed the term “heping jueqi”, or “Peaceful Rise.” Zheng Bijian, a senior
adviser to President Hu Jintao, coined the term at the Boao Forum for Asia in November
2003.228 As Ramo noted,
Chinese officials’ interest in the country’s Peaceful Rise is rooted in their 
worry that China’s current acceleration to international power may shake the 
world too much, undermining the country’s ability to grow and to maintain a 
stable internal and external balance.229
In 2004, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao explicitly addressed other nations’ concerns
about China’s increasing power at a press conference, saying China's rise “will not come
at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a
threat to any other country.”230 Eventually Chinese officials began using the term
“Peaceful Development Theory” or “Peaceful Development” rather than “Peaceful Rise”
because of concerns the word “rise” sounded “too aggressive.”231 In the fall of 2004, the
CPC commissioned a study to look at the “rise and fall of great powers over the last 500
227 Ramo, 53.
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years” and this study concluded that much like Deng had prescribed “the best way to 
ensure a continued rise is a peaceful international environment.”232 As Ramo noted at the 
time, without “security guarantees, a peaceful rise would be difficult.. ..China needs a 
stable local environment for growth, and this can only be achieved through 
engagement.”233 In September 2005, Hu gave a speech at the UN’s 60th anniversary 
summit, in which according to the official Chinese news agency, he argued that “the 
Chinese nation loves peace, and China’s development will not hurt or threaten anyone, 
but serve peace, stability and common prosperity in the world.”234 In December 2005, 
the CPC released a white paper policy statement entitled “China's Peaceful Development 
Road” as part of its effort to counter the spread of the “China threat” theory. The white 
paper attempted to convince other countries that they had nothing to fear from an 
increasingly powerful China and argued that “to achieve peaceful development is a 
sincere hope and unremitting pursuit of the Chinese people.”235
Despite their concern over the “China threat” theory, throughout the 2000s 
Chinese officials became increasingly confident on the world stage and began to 
articulate new Chinese views on foreign policy. These new theories built upon previous 
staples of Chinese foreign policy such as non-interference and maintaining a peaceful 
international environment, but nevertheless represented China reaching out to the world
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80
in ways it had not before. Chinese officials and scholars offered what they viewed as 
alternatives to Western democratic and liberal social and economic models and argued 
that unlike Western powers in the past, China would not seek to exploit other countries. 
Instead Chinese officials spoke of how China and countries throughout the developing 
world could form “win-win relationships” supposedly in contrast to previous 
relationships with Western powers which had not benefitted developing countries.
New Frontier Diplomacy
As noted above, in the 2000s Chinese leadership under Hu placed great importance
on improving and expanding relationships with developing countries, many of which
were rich in natural resources. This policy was eventually termed “New Frontier”
diplomacy or the “New Frontier” policy by Chinese officials. As Kurlantzick noted, “in
statements and speeches, Chinese leaders began to enunciate a doctrine of ‘win-win’
relations” claiming that both China and nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia could benefit from closer relationships.237 While China had courted developing
countries under Mao, and Deng had repeatedly expressed China’s place in the Third
World, this new outreach under Hu was a far more expansive effort to engage Third
World and developing countries. As Jianwei Wang noted,
on the surface, China’s ‘new frontier’ diplomacy is a kind of repetition of its 
foreign policy practice during the Mao era in which according to Mao’s 
theory of ‘three worlds,’ the Third World countries are the true allies of China 
in international affairs and China should always stand on the side of the Third 
World to engage in the struggle against the two superpowers.238
As part of “New Frontier” diplomacy Chinese officials did play up their shared history of
236 Jianwei Wang, 34.
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suffering under Western colonialism and continued to portray China as the representative 
or protector of developing world interests against the dominant Western world, 
particularly the U.S. Echoing Deng’s earlier statements from 1984 that China would 
“always belong to the Third World”, in a 2004 speech in Brazil, Hu declared “that China 
would always ‘stay on the side of developing countries.’”239 In December 2005, Cheng 
Siwei, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress, said in a speech to 
the China-Latin America Friendship Association, that “both [China and Latin America] 
belong to the developing world and have identical or similar views on many issues.”240 
Cheng Siwei also frequently referenced China’s and Latin America’s shared experiences 
with colonialism, telling one audience “I think we have very good feelings toward each 
other because we both have a history of being invaded by colonialists.”241
Notwithstanding similarities between Deng’s and Hu’s rhetoric on Third World or 
developing world ties, the real level of China’s engagement with the developing world 
increased dramatically under Hu in the early 2000s. Beijing’s increasingly pro-active 
diplomacy in Latin America and Africa was an especially stark example, with an
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unusually high number of high-level visits to the regions.242 Latin American and African 
leaders also visited Beijing more frequently. For example, Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez visited China four times between 1999 and 2008. In 2006, the PRC also for the 
first time released an official white paper on China’s Africa Policy, signaling the 
increased importance Chinese leadership placed on Sino-African relations. As China 
increased its outreach to Latin America and Africa it did cause some alarm among 
scholars and officials in West. In keeping with Deng’s general guidance to avoid 
conflicts and to “hide capabilities,” Chinese officials tended to downplay China’s 
expanded interests in the developing world.243
The initial results of China’s expanded outreach to Latin America and Africa, 
however, were hard to ignore. While trade between Latin America and China was only 
$200 million in 1975 and roughly $2 billion in the early 1990s, by 2003 it had grown 
more than tenfold to $26.8 billion, and then continued to grow roughly $10 billion each 
year for the next three years reaching at least $60 billion by 2006.244 Hu set a goal of 
reaching $100 billion in trade between China and Latin America (and Africa) by 2010, 
but according to Chinese officials trade had already exceeded this level three years ahead 
of schedule in 2007, largely because of Latin American countries increasing exports of 
raw materials to China.245 Likewise, China’s outreach to Venezuela convinced 
Venezuelan President Chavez to pledge to direct more of Venezuela’s large oil industry 
towards China instead of the U.S.246 In the 2000s Chinese and Latin American officials 
also signed numerous agreements covering a wide variety of topics including
242 Jianwei Wang, 21-22.
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947transportation, judicial, economic, and political issues, as well as technology transfers.
In 2004, during Hu’s visit to Brazil, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 
announced that Brazil would send advisers to Beijing to study the Chinese economic 
system.248 In 2005, Chile became the first Latin American country to sign a free trade 
agreement with China and that same year China and Caribbean countries held the first 
meeting of the China-Caribbean Forum.249 By 2006, China had gained “standing 
observer status” to both the Organization of American States and the Latin American 
Parliament250 The Chinese government also drastically increased the amount of aid it 
provided to Latin America, from basically nothing in the mid-1990s to at least $700 
million by 2004.251 In 2004, Hu visited Latin America and pledged that China planned to
9S9invest $ 100 billion in the region over the next ten years. As of 2004, China had 
already invested roughly $1.76 billion in Latin America.
China’s trade, investment, and interaction with Africa expanded dramatically as 
well. China’s trade with Africa grew from roughly $820 million in 1979 to over $10 
billion in 2000, to $39.5 billion in 2005, and over $50 billion by 2006.254 Similarly, trade 
between China and sub-Saharan African nations increased by over 250 percent between 
2001 and 2005 255 By 2007 China had become the third largest trading partner with 
Africa after the U.S. and France and had passed the World Bank to become the largest
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provider of loans to Africa.256 China’s aid to Africa similarly rose from about only $100 
million in the mid-1990s to about $2.7 billion in 2004.257 Chinese officials also created a 
development fund with reportedly $5 billion to help Chinese firm invest in African
258countries. By 2006, China was investing roughly a total of $6.64 billion across almost 
50 different African countries.259
The major difference between the Maoist era outreach to Africa and Latin 
America and the “New Frontier” diplomacy under Hu was that now “political 
considerations [were] overshadowed by economic rationales.” According to Chinese 
officials’ new theories on China’s foreign relations “diplomacy should be used to promote 
economic relations with these [developing world] countries instead of the other way
“7 f \  1around.” This new policy was in many ways a natural outgrowth of China’s almost 
singular focus on economic growth since Deng’s reforms. The policy of placing 
economic relations above political relations also comported well with China’s 
longstanding policy of non-interference in other nations’ affairs. Most importantly, 
however, this policy of placing “economics in command” allowed China to 
“unapologetically concentrate its economic diplomacy on those African, Latin American, 
and Middle Eastern countries rich in oil and other natural resources.”262 China was also 
able to use its “New Frontier” diplomacy to target countries in Africa and Latin America 
which still had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and was able in many cases to entice
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*)(\Kthese nations to switch their recognition to Beijing.
The Beijing Consensus
Part of the reason that China’s outreach to developing countries in the late 1990s 
and 2000s was so successful was that leaders in these countries were eager to attempt to 
replicate China’s stunning economic growth. By now, China’s decades of consistent 
economic growth were known throughout the world, and elites in many developing 
nations viewed China as a model of development. They saw China as a kindred spirit, a 
former weak developing nation, which had suffered under colonialism, not unlike their 
own countries. Now, however, China was a world renowned economic powerhouse, 
which commanded the attention and respect of Western nations. Moreover, China had 
done all this without accepting Western style democratic political reforms or 
relinquishing state control of much of its economy. Western officials and organizations 
had generally argued to developing nations that the key to development and economic 
success was democratization of the political system and liberalization of the economy. 
This package of policy recommendations was known as the “Washington Consensus” and 
had emerged in the initial years following the end of the Cold War. The Washington 
Consensus “stressed rapid-free market reforms as a path to prosperity” and linked 
economic development and economic liberalization with political liberalization.264 Elites 
in developing nations, however, had watched the experience of nations in Eastern Europe 
many of whom, after the fall of the Soviet Union, had embraced the Washington 
Consensus and democratized and liberalized rapidly. The results had been less than
263 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 142-143. Jianwei Wang, 26.
264 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 56.
86
encouraging, with many of these Eastern European countries experiencing great political
and economic turmoil. As Ramo wrote in 2004, China’s new model of development
replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory 
made famous in the 1990s for its prescriptive, Washington-knows-best 
approach to telling other nations how to run themselves. The Washington 
Consensus.. .left a trail of destroyed economies and bad feelings around the 
globe.”265
In contrast, officials in developing countries were impressed that China had able to make 
such large economic gains on their own without following the Western liberal democratic 
model. Chinese officials played up the idea of China being a model of development “for 
social and economic success” for developing nations, and increasingly attempted to sell 
the China model in speeches to developing-world audiences.266 This marked an 
important transition for Chinese officials and was evidence that they were now confident 
enough in China’s development and their place in the world to attempt to export China’s 
model of development overseas.267 Ramo is credited with labeling China’s model for 
development the “Beijing Consensus.”268 Gradually other scholars also began to refer to 
China’s blend of authoritarianism and state-led capitalism by this name.269 In contrast to 
the Washington Consensus the Beijing Consensus promoted state lead capitalism, and 
limited political reform. The Beijing Consensus argued that countries could achieve 
economic growth by having the state continue to direct some of a country’s economic 
development while maintaining political control and slowly opening the economy up to 
market reforms. These policies in turn would allow developing countries a way to avoid 
the major dislocations that come from rapid economic liberalization, “thus allowing a
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nation to build its economic strength.”270 The Beijing Consensus challenged Western 
economic and development models and stood “in direct contrast to democratic
771liberalism.” Minxin Pei, a China expert, called the China model “gradualist reform 
dictated by authoritarian politics.” The CPC had implemented economic reforms slowly, 
keeping a large role for the state in the economy and many state-owned enterprises, and 
doing “whatever was necessary to ensure the Party’s survival.”272 Throughout the 2000s 
Chinese officials promoted China’s “socioeconomic model” in speeches abroad, arguing 
that developing nations should adopt their model of “top-down control of development
'yn'iand poverty reduction in which political reform is sidelined for economic reform.” 
Chinese publications and “government-linked think tanks” adopted the phrase “Beijing 
Consensus” and “contrasted it with the Washington Consensus.”274 With China’s 
economy still booming it was hard to argue with the China model. Indian sociologist 
Ramgopal Agarwala stated in 2002, that “China’s successful experiment should be the 
most admired in human history. Other countries should respect and learn from her.” 
Similarly, in 2003, WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi stated in a speech that 
“China’s robust economic performance... should be a source of inspiration for other 
developing countries”276
China’s unique blend of authoritarianism and state directed capitalism held
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enormous appeal for rulers and elites in non-democratic developing countries who feared 
that instituting Western style democratic or liberal reforms would threaten their hold on 
power. As Kurlantzick noted, for officials in authoritarian nations “the proof cannot be 
ignored: China has liberalized much of its economy, yet the Communist Party still rules 
the country.”277 As part of China’s increased outreach to developing nations, Chinese 
officials also emphasized China’s longstanding policy of non-interference, which again 
held strong appeal for authoritarian regimes concerned that the West might attempt to 
remove them from power. Spreading China’s principle of non-interference to other 
authoritarian regimes benefited both these regimes and China, by serving to undermine 
the philosophical legitimacy of any future Western attempt to intervene in a nation. 
Chinese officials therefore continued to preach the non-interference doctrine to 
developing nations, particularly those which the West had isolated (normally for various 
human rights abuses), and China looked to build “a ring of allies who share[d] Beijing’s 
suspicion of nations intervening in other countries’ affairs.”278
China Embraces Multilateral Organizations
As Chinese officials embarked on their new global strategy they also dramatically 
increased China’s interactions with multilateral organizations. Chinese officials in the 
third and fourth generations had drastically different opinions on how China should deal 
with multilateral organizations compared to their predecessors and as a result China went 
from avoiding these organizations to using them as a key part of Chinese foreign policy. 
Kai He went so far to say that “after the Cold War, the most stunning foreign policy
277 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 57-58.
278 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 41-42.
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change by China is its gradual embrace of multilateral institutions.”279 As Kurlantzick 
notes, “older Chinese leaders had seen [multilateral organizations] as constraints on 
China’s power and venues for other nations to criticize China.” 280 Similarly, Kai He 
argued that even as late as the early 1990s “Chinese leaders still lived in the ‘high church 
of realpolitik,’ and multilateral institutions were an alien concept for policy makers in 
Beijing.” 281 Ramo further noted in 2004 that China’s increasing willingness to embrace 
numerous regional multilateral organizations in Asia “compares strikingly with Beijing’s 
distrust, as recently as 10 years ago, of multilateral organizations.”282 In 2007 the official 
People s Daily proclaimed that “the upholding of multilateralism has been the striking 
feature of China’s diplomacy over the past few years, as [China has] engaged more with 
international and regional organizations.” The next year in 2008, Chinese foreign 
policy expert Jean-Marc F. Blanchard cited this same article as evidence that “China 
afford[ed] multilateralism strong rhetorical support.” 284 Kai He also noted in 2008 that 
“compared to its initial reluctance and suspicion about multilateral institutions, China has 
gradually set multilateral diplomacy through institutions as one of the cornerstones of 
Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War.” 285 The shift in Chinese officials’ attitudes 
and embrace of multilateral organizations was so dramatic that in 2004, Susan Shirk 
referred to China as a “born-again regional multilateralist.”
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As noted above, between 1948 and 1971, China belonged to only one 
intergovernmental organization (IGO), the UN. This number rose to 21 by 1976, 37 by 
1989, and by 2005 China belonged to over 50 IGOs “encompassing the political, 
economic, social, scientific, technological, and even security realms.”287 By 2008, China 
had become a signatory to more than 250 multilateral treaties and by its own accounting 
belonged to more than 130 international organizations.288 Zhongqi Pan commented on 
this drastic change in 2008 saying the “China which had isolated itself through much of 
the three decades prior to 1979, is now fully engaged internationally through its
n o n
memberships in the majority of IGOs.” China was even instrumental in the creation of 
the first multilateral organization in the 21st century, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) in 2001.290
Part of the reason for this about face was Chinese officials’ increasing concern 
about the “China threat” mentality and the prospect that other nations would work to 
constrain China’s rise. Chinese officials began to realize that by avoiding participating in 
multilateral institutions China had actually been giving other countries further reason to 
be worried that an increasingly powerful China would act against other nations’ interests. 
As Kurlantzick noted, Chinese officials “realized that by avoiding multilateral 
organizations in the past, [China] had only stoked [other countries’] fears of Beijing, 
since other countries had less interaction with Chinese diplomats and few forums to
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discuss issues of concern with Chinese leaders.”291 By joining and becoming more active 
in multilateral organizations, Chinese officials hoped to prove that China was a 
responsible nation, which wished to work with other countries rather than disrupt or 
dominate the international system. The official People s Daily noted that part of this 
strategy was laid out in the report of the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, and 
indicated the report argued that, “China will take an active part in multilateral activities,
7Q7and play a constructive role within international and regional frameworks.” As 
Kurlantzick noted, “by working with multilateral organizations” China could “signal to 
other countries that it can play by international rules and be a responsible power” thus
•  7Q^gaining greater acceptance from other nations for China’s rise. Most importantly, 
Chinese officials wanted to convince other nations that they did not need to balance or 
work against China and attempt to limit its rise. Chinese officials believed that by 
engaging in multilateral institutions, China might be able to avoid the disruptions and 
counter-balancing that had accompanied the rise of previous growing world powers. As 
Chow Chung-yan noted, the “Peaceful Rise” and “Peaceful Development” theories 
actually discuss how “China can avoid the historical problems associated with rising 
powers [partially] through active participation in international organisations and 
institutions.”294
While China’s increased engagement with multilateral organizations was new, it 
in some ways was a just a different method to pursue Deng’s main foreign policy goal of 
ensuring that China had a peaceful and stable international environment to develop in.
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With the prevalence of the “China threat” theory increasing, and China increasingly 
relying on foreign sources of energy (normally delivered via international shipping lanes) 
to power its economy, Chinese officials believed they needed to become more involved in 
the multilateral organizations which helped shape the international environment in order 
to ensure these organizations were not used to constrain China. Yu Sui, a researcher at 
the Beijing-based China Research Center of Contemporary World Studies, commented on 
China’s “increasing willingness to engage [in] multilateral activities” and argued that this 
was partially a result of Chinese officials’ realization that participating in more 
multilateral organizations could contribute to China’s longstanding goal of ensuring a 
“peaceful, stable and friendly international and surrounding environment.”295 Likewise, 
Blanchard argued that Chinese leaders increased their interaction with multilateral 
organizations because they realized they could be used to help promote China’s security, 
political, and economic interests.296 Chinese leaders also began to realize that China 
could use multilateral institutions as a way to balance against U.S. power (which they 
feared would be used to prevent China’s rise) without directly confronting the U.S. This 
served both China’s longstanding goal of avoiding confrontation with major powers, 
particularly the U.S., as well as China’s goal of moving away from a uni-polar world 
which could potentially threaten China’s development.
China’s new embrace of multilateral institutions also extended to its “New 
Frontier” diplomacy. As Jianwei noted, Chinese officials realized that multilateral 
organizations could be used to achieve results which were “not always attainable in 
traditional bilateral diplomacy” particularly in its efforts to improve relations with
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developing countries.297 One of the primary examples of China’s increasing use of 
multilateral institutions to advance its goals in the developing world is Chinese officials’ 
creation of the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC).298 In October 2000 
China held the first ministerial conference of FOCAC in Beijing. Ministers from 44 
countries and 17 international and regional organizations attended the conference which 
passed the “Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the 
Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development.” The 
second FOCAC ministerial conference was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in December 
2003, the third in Beijing in November 2006, and the fourth in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in 
November 2009. At the November 2006 FOCAC summit, China adopted the “Beijing 
Declaration and Action Plan” which elevated China-Africa relations to the new level of 
“strategic partnership.”299 In the lexicon of Chinese foreign policy there are two types of 
relationships between China and other countries: “cooperative partner” and “strategic 
partner.” By raising China-Africa relations to the “strategic partner” level, Chinese 
officials were signaling the prominent role that African countries now played in China’s 
diplomatic strategy and priorities. At the 2006 FOCAC conference Hu also announced 
that China would provide $5 billion worth of loans to Africa and that China was creating 
the “China-Africa Development Fund” which would initially have $1 billion to 
encourage Chinese investment in Africa.
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Backlash Against China’s “New Frontier” Policy; Reconsidering Non-Interference
Although China largely benefited from its new outreach to African and Latin
American countries, critics in these countries and the West argued that rather than truly
pursuing “win-win” relationships, China was actually practicing “neo-colonialism” by
exploiting developing countries to gain access to their natural resources, much like
former colonial powers had done.300 As Jianwei noted in 2008,
China’s aggressive efforts of securing the supply of oil and other natural 
resources directly from African and Latin American countries bypassing the 
world market and ‘locking up’ monopoly rights to explore oil, natural gas and 
other minerals in those countries convinced many Westerners that China is 
pursuing a strategy of ‘robbing’ natural resources in the [sp] Third World 
countries.301
Activists from developing countries also argued that China’s poor labor and 
environmental standards were hurting local populations and that the flood of cheap 
Chinese goods was hurting local producers. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there were 
several anti-Chinese riots and protests in countries in the developing world, and many 
developing countries enacted tariffs as a way to counter the flood of cheap Chinese 
goods.302
Western countries were also wary that China’s expansion into Africa and Latin 
America was a precursor of a more aggressive China, fitting the “China threat” theories. 
Western nations criticized China’s policy of providing loans or other support to countries 
regardless of the other country’s governments political or human rights record. Chinese 
officials argued that this was a logical extension of China’s long-standing non-
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interference policy.303 However, since the “New Frontier” policy was a new endeavor, 
Chinese officials were caught somewhat off guard by the negative reaction to their 
efforts. As Jianwei noted in 2008, “as a whole, Beijing is ill-prepared for dealing with 
the global repercussion of its ‘new frontier’ diplomacy. Very often Beijing failed to 
foresee such consequences and was slow in reacting and taking effective measures to 
address the problems.”304
Another consequence of the success of China’s expanded outreach to Latin 
American, African, and other developing countries, was that it increased China’s interests 
in these countries. As a result, internal events in these countries increasingly had the 
potential to negatively impact Chinese economic interests such as access to oil and 
natural gas fields. This forced Chinese officials to re-examine China’s long standing non­
interference policy. With China’s economy increasingly dependent on foreign supplies of 
natural resources and energy, Chinese officials could no longer always ignore internal 
events in other countries. Moreover, because of China’s willingness to deal with any 
nation and provide aid with no strings attached, regardless of the country’s political 
structure or human rights record, many of the developing countries China had embraced 
were unstable and/or led by authoritarian regimes. Whereas Chinese officials had 
originally been willing to take the risk to invest in sometimes unstable developing 
countries, eventually Chinese leaders realized that such instability “constitute[d] a major 
obstacle in deepening China’s relations with” these countries and often threatened 
Chinese access to natural resources. As Jianwei noted in 2008,
with China’s economic stakes in African and Latin American countries
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getting higher, Beijing is forced to modify its adherence to the ‘non­
intervention’ principle. In other words, China can no longer take an 
indifferent attitude towards the domestic development in developing 
countries as such development could have an adverse impact on China’s 
interest.306
In fact, while China claimed to want peace and stability as a principle, its focus on 
stability (above all else, including human rights) in Africa and other areas of the world 
was undoubtedly also because China’s economic investments required such stability. In 
this sense China’s focus on stability in Latin America and Africa also represented a 
logical extension of Deng’s guidance that China required a stable and peaceful 
international environment in order to focus on economic development. During the 2006 
FOCAC conference, Hu told African leaders in effect that peace and stability were “the 
preconditions for Africa’s development and prosperity and China will spare no effort to 
support the course of peace and stability in Africa.” Scholars have also argued that 
Chinese officials’ concern that instability would negatively affect Chinese investments 
explains why China was willing to send peacekeeping troops to Africa during the 1990s 
and 2000s, something which was likely unimaginable in the 1970s and 1980s.308 Jianwei 
calculated that between 1990 and 2008 China sent more than 3,000 peacekeeping troops 
to Africa for twelve different peacekeeping operations.309 Hu meanwhile claimed in 2008 
that China had “sent more than 10,000 peacekeepers to 22 UN peacekeeping operations” 
around the world.310
One particular example of China’s changing stance on non-interference is China’s
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shift in polices towards Sudan in the 2000s in regards to the conflict in Darfur. Despite
many claims that genocide was occurring in Darfur in 2003 and 2004, China initially
stood by its non-interference policy and argued “that pressure or intervention [would] not
1^1produce desired results.” Chinese officials stated that the international community 
should respect Sudan’s sovereignty and only send peacekeeping troops in with the 
consent of the Sudanese government.312 Chinese officials were eventually forced to alter 
this policy, however, as China’s support for the Sudanese regime began to attract more 
and more negative attention and threatened to hamper China’s relations with other 
countries. The negative press particularly threatened to tarnish the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics which were supposed to be China’s moment to “come out” on the world stage 
as a major 21st century power. As Jianwei noted, “Beijing suddenly realized that the 
domestic development in Sudan could jeopardize broader foreign policy interests]” and 
eventually was forced to “compromise its stand on ‘non-intervention’ to control the 
damage.”313 Hu appointed a special envoy for the Darfur issue and began to pressure the 
Sudanese President to work with the UN.314 China’s changing calculations regarding the 
Darfur crisis and the costs and benefits of non-interference thus exemplify how as China 
became more engaged throughout the world, it was forced to modify and even at times 
abandon, to a degree, its non-interference policy. As Jianwei noted, China’s experience 
with Sudan “certainly taught Chinese leaders a lesson: as an emerging world power, 
China can no longer just do business as usual with African countries while totally
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ignoring the domestic situation in those countries.”315 Issues which China had previously 
considered to be another nations’ “internal” or “domestic” business could now negatively 
impact China’s own economic and foreign policy interests. While China generally still 
espoused its policy of non-interference under Hu, Chinese officials could sometimes be 
persuaded to support intervention or to take action regarding another country if they 
believed that China’s interests were threatened.317
“Harmonious World”
By the mid 2000s Hu had begun to incorporate many of the new tenants of 
Chinese foreign policy into what would become known as the “Harmonious World” 
(hexie shijie) concept. The official Chinese news agency argued in 2005 that the two 
primary aspects of the “Harmonious World” proposal were creating “a new concept of 
security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation” and the 
assertion that “every country has the right to independently choose its own social system 
and path of development.”318 According to the official People s Daily, Hu first used the 
phrase “harmonious world” in a May 2003 speech at the Moscow Institute of 
International Relations, when he stated “in order to achieve lasting peace and universal 
prosperity, the international community should cooperate fully with unremitting efforts, 
so as to build a harmonious world.” 319 Many scholars argue, however, that Hu really 
introduced the “Harmonious World” concept in April 2005 at the Asia-Africa summit in
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Jakarta when he argued that the countries represented at the conference should “promote 
friendly coexistence, equality-based dialogues, and common development and prosperity 
of different civilizations, in order to create a harmonious world.” 320 Hu further detailed 
the “Harmonious World” concept at the UN’s 60th anniversary summit in September 
2005. “Harmonious World” argued that although countries had different economic, 
political, and social systems they should still work together on issues of mutual concern 
and form “win-win” solutions while respecting one another’s differences. According to 
the “Harmonious World” theory “all countries have the right to independently choose 
their own social systems and paths of development and this right should be respected.”322 
Rather than all attempting to pursue one single model of development, countries should 
learn from the “strong points” of other nations, increase dialogue, learn from one 
another’s cultures, and “develop together by seeking common ground while putting aside 
differences.” 323 As part of a “Harmonious World” countries should also work “to 
preserve the diversity of civilizations..., make international relations more democratic 
and jointly build a harmonious world where all civilizations coexist and accommodate
' I 'y Aeach other.” Keeping with China’s new focus on using multilateral organizations the 
“Harmonious World” concept also emphasized multilateralism as the key to “realizing] 
common security.”325 Echoing Chinese officials’ comments on pursuing “win-win” 
solutions as part of “New Frontier” diplomacy, Hu argued under the “Harmonious World”
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theory that globalization had made countries’ economic fates more “intertwined” than 
ever before and therefore countries should participate in “mutually beneficial 
cooperation.. .to achieve common prosperity.”326 China’s increasing reliance on selling 
goods overseas and obtaining energy sources from abroad, also likely figured 
prominently in the motivations for formulating the “Harmonious World” concept. 
According to Hu, as part of efforts to achieve a harmonious world, countries should work 
to “establish and improve a multilateral trading system that is open, fair and non- 
discriminatory,” and increase cooperation on energy matters to ensure “energy security 
and energy market stability.”
Although the term “Harmonious World” was new, it built upon several long­
standing concepts in Chinese foreign policy, such as China’s non-interference policy. 
When outlining the “Harmonious World” concept, Hu reiterated China’s advocacy for 
non-interference, arguing that “we should all oppose acts of encroachment on other 
countries’ sovereignty, forceful interference in a country’s internal affairs, and willful use 
or threat of military force.”328 The “Harmonious World” concept also continued Chinese 
officials’ efforts (dating back to Mao and Deng) to portray China as the protector or 
leader of developing countries by arguing for a larger role for developing, small, and 
medium-sized countries in international decision making and more consensus-driven 
decisions at the UN (an implicit argument that the U.S. and other major powers too often 
acted without the consent or agreement of developing countries).329 Perhaps most 
importantly, “Harmonious World” built on Deng’s guidance to seek a stable international
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system so that China could focus on its own development. Like Deng’s previous
guidance, “Harmonious World” continued to argue that,
China’s interests are best served through a foreign policy that seeks a 
peaceful external environment so that the country can devote its energies 
principally to domestic economic development, reassure neighbors and key 
partners about China’s benign intentions, and avoid confrontation with other 
major powers, especially the United States.330
An international system which acted in accordance with the “Harmonious World”
philosophy would allow for China’s peaceful development without other nations feeling
threatened by China’s rise. The official People s Daily noted that at the August 2006
Central Foreign Affairs Conference, “the [Chinese] government vowed to create a sound
international environment and favorable external conditions for the country’s
development and to contribute to the construction of a harmonious world” echoing both
1
Deng’s and Hu’s key foreign policy statements. In 2007, the official People s Daily 
also stressed how the “Harmonious World” concept was consistent with Zhou Enlai’s 
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” from 1954, Deng Xiaoping’s “Independent 
Foreign Policy of Peace” from the 1980s, and the “Path of Peaceful Development” from 
the early 2000s. Similarly, when commenting on the “Harmonious World” policy,
Ruan Zongze, the deputy director of the China Institute of International Studies, argued 
that “the continuity in the strategies of different generations of Chinese leaders shows that 
China, facing a complex and changing world, has always regarded peace and harmony as 
a priority.”333
Despite all these lofty statements, as Callahan noted “in practice, the official view
330 Bergsten et al., 49.
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of [‘Harmonious World’] lacks detail. The Beijing government tends to describe the 
policy in terms of vague platitudes,” making it difficult to link it to concrete actions. 334 
The very global nature of the term “Harmonious World” and its accompanying 
suggestions for how international affairs should be conducted, however, were a 
recognition by Chinese officials that China was becoming a world power and that China 
had interests around the globe. Similar to their promotion of the Beijing Consensus, the 
“Harmonious World” concept represented an important transition for Chinese officials. It 
was a sign that Chinese officials were now confident enough to present their own views 
for how global affairs should operate, even if these views conflicted with Western 
models. As Blanchard and fellow China expert Sujian Guo argued, “Harmonious World” 
“gained traction” among Chinese officials “because China’s economic growth, diplomatic 
successes, and rising military capabilities, among other factors, ha[d] given Chinese 
political and intellectual elites the feeling that they [could] and should do more in world 
affairs.” In 2007, when commenting on the “Harmonious World” concept, Wu 
Jianmin, president of the Foreign Affairs University in China (also referred to as the 
China Foreign Affairs Institute), told the official People s Daily that “China’s diplomacy 
has become more active and mature as the country’s national strength developed.” 
Similarly, Yuan Peng, a Chinese expert on international relations, noted in 2007 that “by 
applying this concept [‘Harmonious World’], Chinese diplomacy has taken a new turn, 
pushing China into a new and powerful role in world affairs.”337
Although it was heavily influenced by previous Chinese concepts of foreign
334 Callahan.
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policy, “Harmonious World” also grew out of Hu’s earlier domestic policy efforts called 
“Harmonious Society.” As the People’s Daily noted in 2007 “the ‘Harmonious Society’ 
is a political catchphrase in China today, by which President Hu Jintao aims to lead the 
government in closing the wealth divide and easing growing social tensions. The concept 
of a ‘Harmonious World’ is an extension of Hu’s domestic policy into the arena of foreign 
relations.” Callahan similarly noted that “Chinese officials and scholars regularly 
proclaim ‘Harmonious Society’ - whose formal aim is to use state power to ‘close the 
wealth divide and ease growing social tensions’ - to be ‘the model for the world.’”339 
“Harmonious Society” was a reaction to criticisms that in the pursuit of continuous rapid 
economic development Chinese officials had subordinated all other concerns. While 
China’s economy had experienced remarkable overall economic growth since Deng’s 
reform, that rapid economic growth had not been equally distributed and had in many 
instances resulted in great instability. Most of the economic growth had occurred in the 
southern and eastern provinces of China, while large sections of the western and northern 
parts of China remained underdeveloped. Likewise, the push for economic growth at all 
costs had led to the dislocation of many Chinese as well as destruction of the 
environment in many areas. This resulted in increasing domestic protests throughout 
China and claims that the CPC’s policies were only benefiting a small percentage of 
Chinese while the vast majority remained poor. Rampant corruption in the CPC and 
among local government officials only added to the sense of outrage among poorer 
Chinese. “Harmonious Society,” therefore, looked to rebalance Chinese domestic 
economic policy and development. The broad goals of “Harmonious Society” were to
338 “Harmonious World: China's Ancient Philosophy for New International Order.”
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balance China’s continuing need for economic growth with a greater appreciation for 
other concerns including more balanced development geographically, the effects of 
economic transformations on different populations in China, and the effects of new 
industries on the environment.
Hu and other Chinese officials attempted to link these domestic policies with 
China’s evolving foreign policy goals. As Deng had argued 30 years ago, in order for 
China to continue developing it would need stability and a peaceful environment, not 
only at home but also abroad. In the same manner, Chinese officials presented 
“Harmonious World” as a logical outgrowth of “Harmonious Society.” When Yuan Peng 
commented on “Harmonious World” and “Harmonious Society”, in 2007 he stated “the 
latter is the foundation of the former, and the former the guarantee of the latter. Domestic 
and international affairs should be seen as a whole.”340 Likewise, Blanchard and Guo 
argued, “the concept of ‘Harmonious World’ is the extension of ‘Harmonious Society’ 
into the international arena and the other side of [the] coin in the Chinese leadership’s 
management of domestic and foreign policy issues.”341 Just as “Harmonious Society” 
promised to listen to the concerns of all Chinese and to balance their interests while still 
pursuing development, “Harmonious World” promised to listen to the concerns of all 
nations and to seek mutually beneficial solutions.
Both “Harmonious World” and “Harmonious Society” also built on traditional 
Confucian values which the Chinese government had begun to promote, along with 
Chinese nationalism, following the decline of the utility of communism as a unifying
340 Yuan Peng.
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105
342ideology. Chinese officials and scholars played up the idea that “Harmonious World” 
was a natural outgrowth of Chinese culture. In 2007, the official People s Daily 
published an article entitled “Harmonious World: China’s Ancient Philosophy for New 
International Order” which argued that the focus on “harmony” was “not freshly coined 
political jargon* but a philosophical tradition” with a several thousand year history in 
China.”343
The “Harmonious World” strategy was also developed partially in reaction to the
“China threat” theory and the criticisms that as China expanded its relations with the
developing world and its neighbors, it was exploiting other countries’ resources,
encouraging rogue regimes, and in general not acting as a responsible major power.
Through the “Harmonious World” philosophy Chinese officials hoped to show that rather
than being a disruptive power which was destabilizing the international system, that
China was in fact a responsible power which sought peaceful and “harmonious” relations
between all nations of the world.344 In 2007, the official People s Daily tried to
emphasize that throughout its history China had been focused on harmony and peace and
by its very nature was not a threat to other countries writing:
Italian missionary Matteo Ricci, who came to China more than 400 years 
ago, wrote after studying Chinese history, and especially after comparing the 
Chinese and European history, that the Chinese were contented with the 
status quo and cherished harmony and peace. The Chinese nation by its 
nature had no ambition for overseas conquest, he concluded.345
The phrase “Harmonious World” was also “meant to contrast with previous Maoist ideas
of ‘struggle’ and ‘revolution’” as part of Chinese officials’ efforts to convince other
342 Blanchard and Guo. Introduction, 5-6.
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nations that China’s rise did not pose a threat.346 As Bergsten and his co-authors noted in 
2008,
China’s kinder, gentler approach has sought to make China’s rise in power 
more acceptable and perhaps legitimate in the eyes of the world, particularly 
along its periphery, which otherwise might view China’s emergence with 
alarm and coalesce to contain or balance against it.347
PRC policymakers openly acknowledged that “the desire to counter the China threat
perception” was a factor in “China’s championing of a ‘harmonious world.’”348 For
example, in March 2006, Wu Jianmin said that “once China’s ideas on the concept of a
‘Harmonious Society’ and a ‘Harmonious World’ are better understood, fewer people will
believe in the view of ‘China threat.’”349
The “Harmonious World” policy was also formulated to attempt to convince the
U.S. that China was not intent on challenging the U.S.’ role in the current international
system. 350 “Harmonious World” presented less of an outright challenge to the U.S. than
some past Chinese foreign policy formulations, such as Jiang’s “‘building multipolar
world’ (duoji shijie) concept, [which sought] to multipolarize or counterbalance the U.S.-
centric international system.”351 However, while “Harmonious World” did not explicitly
call for multi-polarization, it still clearly challenged some of the attributes of the Western
and U.S. dominated international system. As Blanchard and Guo admitted, “it is fairly
obvious that China’s call [in the ‘Harmonious World’ philosophy] for democratic
international relations, tolerance of distinct social systems and paths to development,
346 Bergsten et al., 212-213.
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increased support for multilateralism, greater efforts to close the North-South gap, and 
open trade are directed, in part, at the U.S.”352
As Bergsten noted, while Chinese officials’ statements often focused on China’s 
promotion of lofty principles such as “Harmonious World” and “New Frontier” 
diplomacy, “in practice.. .China’s idealistic tenets have often fused seamlessly with its 
very practical national interests.”353 China’s advocacy for non-interference allowed 
China to express solidarity with developing nations against the West while preventing the 
establishment of precedents which could be used to intervene in China. Likewise China’s 
focus on dialogue was largely unassailable, even though in practice it allowed China (and 
other nations) to avoid taking action on difficult international issues. The focus on 
dialogue and non-interference also allowed China to continue to pursue its own national 
interests, which normally involved gaining access to energy reserves and other natural 
resources, in countries like Burma, Sudan, and Iran despite those regimes’ poor human 
rights records.354
Rising Chinese Nationalism Pressures Chinese Policymakers
As China expanded its foreign relations around the globe throughout the 2000s, the 
Chinese people became more used to China playing a global role, and Chinese 
confidence continued to rise. By the late 2000s it was hard to miss signs of China’s 
increasingly bold confidence and rising nationalist tendencies. According to one survey 
taken in 2008, 86 percent of Chinese were satisfied with their country’s direction, and 
most believed that China would “eventually replace the U.S. as the world's leading
352 Blanchard and Guo. Introduction, 5.
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power.” That same year, Lau Nai-keung, wrote an article entitled, “The Chinese
People Have Truly Stood Up,” in which (as noted earlier) he argued that China was now
“a full member of the [international] club” and thus a true world power. According to
Lau this new status as a “full member of the club” granted China a greater say in setting
the rules for international relations particularly since previously “China ha[d] been on the
receiving end of these rules, and it knows very well how unjust they are and how
suffocating they can be to development.”356 Lau further warned Western powers that they
would need to adapt to China’s growing power saying:
How the world proceeds will depend on how China’s new position is 
received by the developed countries. Old attitudes and habits die hard. But 
China has changed; it is now up to the West to adjust its attitudes and modify 
its habits.357
Similarly in 2009, Yu Sui, a researcher at the Beijing-based China Research Center of 
Contemporary World Studies, wrote in the China Daily that the world “cannot do without 
a powerful China.” Daniel Lynch, an expert on Chinese foreign and domestic policy 
and Chinese elites, noted that what he called “particularly optimistic Chinese” were 
predicting “that their country will surpass the United States in ‘comprehensive national 
power’ — military, economic and cultural — by the late 2020s.”359 News articles both 
inside and outside China in the late 2000s highlighted the growing sense of confidence 
within China, with titles like “China Oozes Confidence About Future.”360 Hu himself 
proclaimed at the PRC’s 60 anniversary parade in 2009 that the Chinese people were
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“full of confidence” about the future.361
This increasing Chinese confidence and growing prevalence of a more aggressive 
Chinese nationalism can perhaps best be seen, however, in a 2008 article entitled “Proof 
That China Will No Longer Be Bullied,” again written by Lau Nai-keung.362 In this 
article, Lau boasts “I have stressed several times in this column this year that China will 
no longer be bullied; recent incidents have proved my point.” He then goes on to 
proudly cite China’s spuming of France (due to visits between French officials and the 
Dalai Lama), and China’s ignoring of Japanese protests regarding Chinese actions 
towards the contested Diaoyu Islands, as glowing examples of China’s new strength and 
unwillingness to be “bullied.”364 Lau’s article also serves as an example of the growing 
anti-foreign sentiments that were part of Chinese nationalism during the 2000s. Speaking 
of then French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit with the Dali Lama and Sarkozy’s 
criticism of China prior to the Beijing Olympics, Lau states “to most Chinese, Mr. 
Sarkozy is a slimy politician wanting to take advantage of China.” Exemplifying the
increasingly hostile and aggressive sentiments of some strands of Chinese nationalism, 
Lau went so far as to threaten the French for crossing China, saying “the Chinese have a 
long memory. And, when the time comes, they will return a blow.”
While such fiercely nationalist sentiments were becoming more common place 
within China, such “radical nationalistic behavior [was] not in China’s interests” as these 
kinds of statements reinforced the “China threat” theory that Chinese officials had
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worked so hard to combat and undermined their attempts “to preach the ‘peaceful rise’ of 
China” and “Beijing’s claim to act as a responsible major power.”367 As Joseph Cheng 
Yu-shek argued, by the 2000s nationalism had “become a double-edged sword” for the 
Chinese government; stating that “if Chinese people can go and demonstrate in front of 
foreign embassies today, they may march against their own leaders tomorrow.”368 
Despite their role in encouraging this new more aggressive form of Chinese nationalism, 
in the 2000s Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult to control, and nationalistic 
sentiments had translated into new pressures on Chinese officials formulating foreign 
policy. During the late 1990s and early 2000s there were several instances where 
popular nationalistic outbursts actually worked against Chinese government policies. For 
example, Chinese authorities attempted to limit demonstrations following the accidental 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 for fear that the protests 
would negatively impact the U.S.-China relationship. Similarly, in 2005, the Chinese 
government eventually shut down anti-Japanese protests after they expanded and became 
violent for fear that they would cause too much damage to relations with Japan. As 
several scholars have noted, both of these incidents had an effect on the fourth generation 
of leadership, and from 2006 on, when formulating policies on controversial issues such 
as China’s Taiwan policy, Hu actually had to work to rein “in the more hawkish attitudes 
of other Chinese officials...and [keep] nationalist sentiment in check.”371 Similarly, 
commentators noted how some Chinese nationalists “sharply criticized” Hu for
367 Joseph Cheng Yu-shek.
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“conceding too much to China’s most reviled historical enemy” Japan. Lau himself, 
while expressing strongly nationalist sentiments, commented on the predicament Chinese 
officials faced in the 2000s, saying “there is tremendous internal pressure for Beijing to 
take action to defend the country’s vital national interests.... If it appears weak on 
territorial issues, it will have to face nationwide protests.”373 Indeed, during this time 
period Chinese leaders increasingly needed to take nationalist sentiments and reactions 
into account when crafting foreign policy. While Chinese officials may have been 
concerned by the ferocity of anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese protests in the 2000s, they 
“could not afford to show any sign of weakness” lest they be accused of not defending 
China’s interests.374 Such outbursts constrained Chinese officials in their policy options, 
and “under such circumstances [of popular nationalist outburst], flexibility in foreign 
policy became limited, and breakthroughs were impossible in the absence of give and 
take.”375 As Bergsten and his co-authors stated in 2008, even if Chinese leaders 
themselves wanted to play a more constructive role in the international system they had 
“to remain ever mindful of and at times accommodate the growing sense of confident 
nationalism” that was sweeping through China.376
It is difficult to assess whether the increase in Chinese nationalism during the 
1990s and 2000s was primarily a natural result of China’s rapid economic growth or 
whether it was more the result of efforts by Chinese officials to encourage it as substitute 
ideology for communism. Attributing some form of measurement to how much each 
factor mattered is inherently quite difficult, and likely outside the scope of this study.
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Either way, both factors certainly contributed to the rise in nationalist sentiments and the 
increase in Chinese nationalism undoubtedly played a role in encouraging Chinese 
officials to pursue a more active, and eventually a more aggressive, foreign policy. 
Initially this rise in nationalism helped push Chinese officials to expand China’s 
diplomatic horizons and China’s influence around the world. As noted above though, by 
the late 2000s, Chinese officials had discovered that the nationalism which they 
themselves had helped encourage was not always compatible with their foreign policy 
goals and in fact sometimes constrained their foreign policy options.
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12. Conclusion
From the 1970s to the 2000s, China went through several dramatic changes, 
including in its conduct of foreign policy. It went from a country whose leader said it 
would never become a superpower and that if it ever did the world should rise up against 
it, to a country which openly referred to itself as a “great power” and talked about 
surpassing the world’s only superpower (the U.S.) in both economic and military power 
within twenty years. Likewise, China transformed from a country which generally 
avoided multilateral organizations, suspecting that they were tools of Western powers 
designed to undermine China, to a country which proclaimed the need to work more 
within multilateral organizations, and argued that rather than being tools of the West, 
multilateral organizations were actually a key way to limit Western powers. Perhaps most 
importantly, China transitioned from a country which played a passive role in the 
international system and focused almost entirely inwards, to a country which embarked 
on a global outreach to spread Chinese economic interests and influence around the world 
and preached a new model of develop and a new concept of international relations.
Part of the reason for this dramatic shift is that each generation of Chinese 
leadership viewed China’s foreign policy slightly different. Under Mao Zedong ideology 
was in the lead and China’s foreign policy consisted largely of supporting communist and 
revolutionary causes around the world. Following the disaster of Mao’s policies (at home 
and abroad) Deng Xiaoping, pulled China back from Mao’s extreme policies, and focused 
on pragmatic economic reforms. He argued that China was too weak to focus on foreign 
policy and instead should devote all its energy and resources to internal development.
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Deng cautioned his fellow Chinese to “lay low,” to avoid any international issue which 
might entangle China and distract from its internal development, and to avoid taking 
sides in the Cold War. According to Deng, China’s primary foreign policy goal should be 
ensuring a stable and peaceful international environment so that China could focus on its 
internal development. Jiang Zemin had to deal with the international fallout from the 
brutal Tiananmen Square crackdown, as well as the new reality of a uni-polar world 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, Jiang focused most of his energy on 
repairing relations with the U.S. with the goal of discouraging the U.S. from attempting 
to prevent China’s rise. Finally, Hu Jintao oversaw the true emergence of the PRC onto 
the international stage as China embarked on a new global foreign policy strategy aimed 
at securing Chinese access to natural resources to continue to power its voracious 
economy. Hu and the fourth generation of leadership also sought to convince a wary 
international community that the rest of the world had nothing to fear from China’s rise, 
and sought to build a network of supportive countries which would help China’s 
economy survive any potential future conflict with the U.S. or the West.
While changes in the overall leader of the PRC undoubtedly were a factor in 
China’s evolving foreign policy (particularly in the transition from Mao to Deng), there 
were several other changes within Chinese society which helped encourage Chinese 
officials to formulate a more proactive and aggressive foreign policy. As noted above, 
during the 1990s there was a large turnover in Chinese leadership from older CPC 
revolutionaries who had personally taken part in the Chinese Civil War to new third and 
fourth generation leaders. These new CPC officials had more education than their 
predecessors and were overwhelming trained as engineers rather than being
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revolutionaries whp had personally taken part in the 1949 Communist revolution. The 
third and fourth generations of PRC leadership were also more pragmatic and had more 
exposure to the West. As a result they were more likely to better understand how the 
international system operated and thus more likely to advocate for a more sophisticated 
foreign policy.
During the 1990s there was also an important shift within Chinese youth and 
Chinese society. Whereas in the 1980s Chinese youths and academics were calling for 
more liberal reforms of the Chinese government, by the 1990s many young Chinese were 
actually calling for a stronger central government. Even more importantly for Chinese 
foreign policy, where the youth of the 1980s looked to America as an example and a 
beacon of liberty, by the 1990s and 2000s many Chinese youth viewed the U.S. as a 
“bully” who was purposefully attempting to thwart China’s rise. The youth and 
academics of the 1980s had witnessed the horrible results of an aggressive and powerful 
central Chinese government during the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and 
Tiananmen Square. The youth of the 1990s and 2000s in contrast generally had no 
experience with these events and only knew a China in which the economy was booming 
and individuals both inside and outside of China continually spoke of China’s inevitable 
rise.
The decline of communism as a functioning unifying ideology and the rise of 
Chinese nationalism also played a role in pushing both Chinese officials and Chinese 
youth to call for a more aggressive foreign policy. Following the exposure of Mao’s 
policies as disasters, and the subsequent success of Deng’s market-based economic 
reforms, many Chinese no longer had faith in communism. While the CPC still referred
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to itself as a “communist” party, communist ideology factored very little into most of the 
CPC’s decisions; rather Chinese officials focused almost entirely on how to continue to 
develop China’s economy and protect the CPC’s power. Fearful that the decline in faith 
in communism might result in a lack of support for the CPC, the Chinese government 
began encouraging a new form of nationalism as a new unifying ideology. This 
nationalism built upon Chinese historical memories of being subjugated by outside 
powers and contrasted this with China’s expanding economy and bright future. As 
Chinese citizens and officials became more nationalistic, they began to advocate for a 
more forceful defense of China’s interests and thus for a more aggressive Chinese foreign 
policy.
A changing international environment and several key international events also 
had a profound impact on Chinese officials and their attitudes towards Chinese foreign 
policy. During the Cold War Chinese officials were fearful that conflict would break out 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. With Deng’s focus on internal economic 
development, Chinese officials tended to avoid engaging on most foreign policy issues, 
for fear of taking sides and potentially being dragged into a conflict. Likewise, the brutal 
crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the ensuing Western condemnation and 
isolation of China had a large impact on both the third and fourth generations of PRC 
leadership. They saw that despite all the successes of Deng’s “opening up” strategy, the 
West, and the U.S. in particular, could effectively isolate China in a short period of time. 
The fall of the Soviet Union a year later only served to bolster Chinese leaders’ fears that 
the U.S. would turn its sights toward Beijing and seek to isolate the PRC. The ease with 
which the U.S. was able to form a coalition and defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces in the
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first Gulf War that same year further increased Chinese officials’ concerns.
By the turn of the century, China had largely recovered from the isolation it experienced 
following Tiananmen, and relations with the U.S. had, for the most part, been restored. 
China’s economy was still expanding, and as noted above, Chinese youth were 
increasingly confident about China’s future. The accidental NATO bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the collision between a Chinese fighter plane 
and a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in 2001, however, encouraged the fourth generation of 
Chinese leaders as well as Chinese society to re-examine China’s foreign policy strategy. 
To the increasingly nationalistic Chinese youth, both the NATO bombing and the 
collision between U.S. and Chinese planes were a sign that the U.S. was actively working 
to keep China from advancing and evidence that China needed to act more forcefully to 
defend its interests.
China’s increasing need for natural resources was also a major factor in driving 
Chinese officials to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, which should not be under­
estimated. As China’s economy continued to expand, Chinese officials realized that 
domestic sources of energy and natural materials could not keep up with internal demand. 
China was forced to import ever increasing supplies of oil, coal, natural gas, and a variety 
of other raw materials. Following Tiananmen, however, Chinese leaders realized that the 
U.S. controlled many global shipping lanes and had alliances with many key oil 
producers. Chinese officials feared that should another dispute break out between the 
U.S. and China, the U.S. might attempt to cut China off from these resources. Chinese 
officials therefore embarked on a policy of directly engaging countries with large 
supplies of energy and raw materials across the developing world as a means to ensure
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consistent Chinese access to these resources.
Finally, Chinese officials would later craft new strategies in foreign policy in 
response to foreign officials’ and commentators’ concerns over China’s increasing power. 
The emergence of the “China threat” theory, or the idea that as China’s economy 
continued to grow, and the country became increasingly powerful, it would inevitably 
become more aggressive, ultimately disrupting the international system, had a profound 
effect on the fourth generation of Chinese leadership. Chinese officials feared that if 
other countries believed the “China threat” theory, these countries would be less likely to 
work with China and allow it access to resources, or worse, might even form alliances 
designed to balance against it or seek to constrain it. Despite their newfound confidence, 
Chinese officials still strongly believed that China needed a stable and favorable 
international environment to continue to develop. They therefore set out to construct new 
foreign policies strategies and slogans which emphasized China’s supposedly peaceful 
intentions, such as “Peaceful Rise,” “Peaceful Development,” and “Harmonious World.”
Overall, when looking at Chinese foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping to Hu 
Jintao, much changed, and at the same time, much remained the same. Deng 
recommended “lying low” and generally not focusing on foreign policy. However, under 
Hu, China most certainly did not “lay low.” Throughout the 2000s, China embarked on 
an incredibly ambitious expansion of its foreign policy, spreading Chinese investments 
and Chinese interests all over the world. China also offered a new vision of international 
relations and openly discussed its rising strength. Despite all this, though, acting in 
accordance with Deng’s guidance, under Hu China still avoided taking a stance on most 
controversial issues and generally insisted it was advocating for peace and stability.
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Whereas Deng recommended avoiding most multilateral organizations, under Hu, 
China joined the majority of international organizations and multilateral treaties.
However, Chinese officials argued in the “Peaceful Development” and “Harmonious 
World” theories that China could use multilateral organizations to achieve Deng’s goal of 
ensuring a stable and peaceful international environment so that China could continue to 
develop. Likewise, while in the 2000s Chinese elites increasingly talked about China as a 
great power, Chinese officials such as Hu still repeatedly expressed solidarity with the 
Third World, echoing Deng’s statements decades earlier. China’s creation of new 
multilateral institutions to form better relations with the Third World, such as FOCAC, 
represented both a dramatic expansion of China’s outreach to these countries and a 
change in Chinese officials’ attitudes towards multilateral organizations. However, 
China’s goals in establishing groups such as FOCAC, in some ways matched well with 
Deng’s attempts to portray China as a leader of the Third World. Under Hu, Chinese 
officials also began to articulate and promote new theories of Chinese foreign policy such 
as “Harmonious World” which were striking in their scope and global ambitions, 
especially when contrasted with Deng’s guidance that China should not focus on foreign 
issues. At the same time, however, these new theories largely built upon pre-existing 
Chinese ideas regarding foreign policy that Deng himself had advocated such as non­
interference, seeking a peaceful international environment, re-assuring other nations of 
China’s peaceful intentions, and avoiding confrontation with major powers.
In the 2000s China was forced on several occasions to reconsider its non­
interference policy as Chinese officials realized that China’s investment in, and support 
for, authoritarian regimes could negatively affect other Chinese interests. As noted
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above, throughout the 2000s, China even contributed peacekeeping forces to several 
different international efforts, something that would have been almost unimaginable 
under Deng. And yet, at the same time, Chinese officials continued to promote the 
principle of non-interference including it as a tenant of the “Harmonious World” and New 
Frontier” diplomacy theories. Chinese officials’ insistence that economic relations should 
be prioritized over political concerns as part of “New Frontier” diplomacy was also 
largely consistent with Deng’s own guidance for China to focus on economic reforms, 
while limiting political reform. Likewise, while the 2000s saw a newly confident 
Chinese public push Chinese officials to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy, the 
Chinese nationalism that motivated many Chinese to argue for a stronger defense of 
China’s interests was based on many of the same historical memories, such as the 
“Century of Humiliation,” which had motivated Deng and members of the second 
generation of Chinese leadership to argue against the concept of hegemony and China 
becoming involved in most international affairs during the Cold War.
Despite all these similarities, there undoubtedly were dramatic changes in China’s 
conduct of foreign policy from Deng to Hu. Deng’s guidance, however, still held 
enormous sway among Chinese officials even as they jettisoned his preference for “lying 
low” and stepped onto the world stage. At its core, China’s vastly more expansive 
foreign policy in the 2000s was still motivated by the same goal that had led Deng to 
recommend China largely avoid foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s: ensuring China’s 
economic development. While the increasingly active foreign policy of the third and 
fourth generations of Chinese leadership differed drastically from Deng’s passive foreign 
policy, they both focused on promoting China’s economic interests. Thus the history of
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the shifts in Chinese foreign policy from the 1970s to the 2000s is not one of changing 
goals. The goal was broadly always to ensure China’s economic development. The 
history of the shifts in Chinese foreign policy from the 1970s to the 2000s rather is the 
story of how Chinese officials went from viewing foreign policy as a burden which 
would distract from China’s internal development to arguing that a pro-active foreign 
policy was actually essential to ensuring China’s development and continued economic 
growth.
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